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ABSTRACT 
SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION WITH DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES 
Emre Haliloğlu 
M.S. in Industrial Engineering 
Advisor: Prof. Nesim Erkip 
June, 2013 
 
In a typical supply chain, each party tries to optimize his/her own objective that causes the 
poor total supply chain performance. By contracting on a set of transfer payments, each firm’s 
objectives become aligned with the supply chain’s objective, which is called coordination; 
hence the optimal result for the supply chain can be achieved. In the literature, common 
treatment to supply chain coordination for the newsboy problem is to analyze the system 
under the assumption that the objectives’ of the parties are expected profit maximization, 
however the real life observations show that this might not be the case. Hence, this 
assumption is relaxed and the supply chain coordination is studied when the objectives’ of the 
parties are different than the expected profit maximization, which are probability 
maximization of reaching a target profit, expected return on investment maximization and the 
probability maximization of reaching a target return on investment under the wholesale price, 
buy back and the revenue sharing contracts. This thesis reveals that under the assumption of 
compliance, the coordination is possible for some contract types and the objectives if some 
conditions are satisfied, however some contracts cannot coordinate the channel for some 
objectives no matter what the conditions are. 
Keywords: Supply chain coordination, newsboy problem, contract theory, objective types 
different than the expected profit maximization 
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ÖZET 
FARKLI OBJEKTİFLERLE TEDARİK ZİNCİRİ KOORDİNASYONUN 
İNCELENMESİ 
 
Emre Haliloğlu 
Endüstri Mühendisliği Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Nesim Erkip 
Haziran, 2013 
 
Klasik tedarik zincirinde her bir parti kendi yararına olacak şekilde davranma eğilimindedir, 
bu durum tedarik zincirinin toplam performansına zarar vermektedir. Değişik kontratlar 
uygulayarak, her bir partinin hedefinin tedarik zinciriyle paralel olmasını sağlayarak tedarik 
zincirinin toplam performansının en iyilenmesine tedarik zinciri koordinasyonu 
denilmektedir. Gazeteci çocuk problemi için koordinasyonun sağlanıp sağlanmadığı 
literatürde tedarik zincirindeki partilerin hedef fonksiyonlarının beklenen karı en iyilemek 
varsayımı şartıyla incelenmektedir. Bu çalışmada klasik literatürden farklı olarak tedarik 
zinciri partilerinin hedef fonksiyonları; belirli bir kar miktarına ulaşma ihtimalini en iyileme, 
beklenen yatırım oranını en iyileme ve belirli bir yatırım oranına ulaşma ihtimalini en iyileme 
olarak alınmıştır. Çalışılan kontrat tipleri ise toptan satış fiyatı üzerinden yapılan kontratlar, 
satılmayan malların geri alımına ilişkin kontratlar ve alıcının sattığı her üründen elde ettiği 
karın belli yüzdesini tedarikçiye vermesine ilişkin kontratlardır. Bu tezde, belirli şartların 
sağlanması durumunda bazı kontratların bazı hedef fonksiyonları için tedarik zinciri 
koordinasyonunu sağlayabileceğini; bazı kontratların ise bazı hedef fonksiyonları için tedarik 
zinciri koordinasyonunu hiçbir şekilde sağlayamayacağı açığa çıkarılmıştır.  
iv 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tedarik zinciri koordinasyonu, gazeteci çocuk problemi, kontrat teorisi, 
tedarik zinciri partilerinin hedef fonksiyonları 
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CHAPTER  1    INTRODUCTION 
The classical newsvendor problem is a one time business decision about determining 
the number of newspaper orders that should be placed by the newsboy in order to maximize 
the expected profit. Since its first formulation by Whitin (1955), the classical newsvendor 
problem has found applications in a wide variety of business context such as buying style 
goods for retailer, setting safety stock levels for items, selecting the right capacity for a 
facility and deciding the number of overbooking customers for airline companies. All of these 
newsvendor problems share a common mathematical structure. The order quantity for a single 
perishable product with stochastic demand should be decided before observing the demand 
for given unit, cost, selling price, salvage value and the loss of goodwill cost.     
In this thesis, the same problem is examined for the supply chain and the retailer with 
a change in the objective of the classical newsvendor problem; hence objectives we examine 
are different than the expected profit maximization. As in the classical newsvendor problem, 
there is a single perishable product with stochastic demand whose distribution is known. 
Furthermore, there is one supplier and one retailer, and the retailer has a single opportunity to 
place an order before observing the demand.
1
 The supplier has infinite capacity and she has to 
produce all the orders placed by the retailer before the beginning of the selling season.
2
 
Depending on the order quantity, contract type and parameters, there is a transfer money from 
the retailer to the supplier. In order to ensure the supplier not to deviate from the order 
                                                 
1
 The words supplier, manufacturer and the vendor can be used interchangeably. We choose supplier and use 
it throughout the thesis.  
2
 In this work, we adopt the convention that the supplier and the supply chain are female and the retailer is 
male. 
 2 
 
quantity, we assume that the consequences of deviating from the order quantity are severe 
such as court action or loss of good reputation. This is called as compliance in the literature 
(Cachon, 2003). 
Additionally, both parties have no fixed costs and both parties’ variable costs do not 
vary with the order quantity.  Both parties have different loss of goodwill costs due to the lost 
customers when the demand is higher than the quantity produced. On the other hand, there is 
a salvage value when there is not enough demand for the product.  
Even though two parties, one supplier and one retailer, are considered in the setting 
of this thesis, there is also another person, a coordinator who suggests an order quantity, 
which is optimal for the supply chain. The aim of producing exactly the optimal order 
quantity of the supply chain is to make each firm no worse off and at least one party better 
off. Retailer also decides his optimal order quantity according to his objective and the 
parameters.
3
 If the optimal order quantities of the supply chain and the retailer are same and 
both parties, the retailer and the supplier, are happy with the contract parameters, the supply 
chain coordination is achieved. 
Under the assumptions stated above, this thesis investigates the supply chain 
coordination for different objectives under different contracts. What different objectives, 
different contracts and coordination stand for in our work is explained consecutively in the 
following subsections. 
1.1 The Classical Newsvendor Problem and Extensions to 
Different Objectives  
In the classical newsvendor problem, the retailer and the supplier are the two parties 
and the retailer has a single purchasing opportunity before the selling season. It is assumed 
                                                 
3
  We assume that the retailer’s and the supply chain’s objective types should be same. 
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that the demand distribution of the product is known. The ultimate aim of the retailer is to find 
the order quantity that maximizes his expected profit. 
In this problem, the tradeoff for the retailer is the risk of overstocking versus risk of 
understocking. In other words, if he orders too little, he might lose the potential customers, so 
that he misses the opportunity of making more profit, whereas if he orders too much, he might 
suffer from the leftover inventory; therefore his cost may be high. The aim is to overcome this 
tradeoff by choosing the right order quantity, hence the expected profit of the retailer will be 
maximized.  The same problem might be applied to the supply chain, hence the target can be 
to maximize the expected profit of the supply chain, in which case the supply chain faces the 
tradeoff described for the retailer. 
Newsvendor problem was first studied by Whitin (1955).  Whitin examines the style 
goods and assumes that the unsold goods lose all of their values. Since in most of the 
industries there is a salvage value, salvage value has been considered in other studies later, 
hence the classical newsvendor problem is created and widely used in order to solve many 
industrial problems. 
On the other hand, the classical newsvendor problem has some limitations in the real 
world. There can be more complex issues, so that the classical newsvendor problem may 
seem not sufficient to solve these problems. According to Khouja (1999), there are eleven 
extensions to the classical newsvendor problem. In this thesis, different objectives and utility 
functions, which is one if his extensions, is used. 
This extension is started to be analyzed after the realization of the loss averseness of 
the company managers. Loss aversion claims that people are more averse to the losses than 
the same sized gains. One of the earliest studies about the loss aversion is done by 
MacCrimmon, Wehrung and Stanbury (1986).  Their study is based on questionnaire 
responses from 509 high-level executives in American and Canadian ﬁrms, and interviews 
with 128 of those executives in 1973–1974. After the interviews, they conclude that 
manager’s decisions are consistent with the loss aversion.  Some examples can be given for 
 4 
 
the loss aversion case. For instance, Kahn (1992) ﬁnds that Chrysler held larger inventory 
stocks than competitors such as GM and Ford before early 1980 that seemed to imply the 
stockout-avoidance behavior. Moreover, Patsuris (2001) reported that despite the bad 
economy in 2001, many retail chains continued to add stores and ordered even more 
unnecessary supplies.  Furthermore,  Fisher  and  Raman (1996) observed that  managers  of  
a  fashion  apparel  supplier  systematically  order  less  than  the  risk-neutral  manager’s 
order quantity. These examples show that managers’ decisions might not be risk neutral. 
Hence, different objectives and utility functions have been recently considered in the 
literature. 
Many empirical studies indicate that managers are often more interested in 
probability maximization of reaching a target profit level rather than expected profit 
maximization. Kabak and Schiff (1978) are the first authors that study the probability 
maximization of reaching a target profit level. Shih (1979) extends this model by solving the 
optimal order quantity for normally distributed demand without any salvage value and loss of 
goodwill cost. Later, Ismail and Louderback (1979) add loss of goodwill cost and solve the 
same problem for the normal distribution. Finally, Lau (1980) includes all the costs and 
derives the equation for the supply chain’s optimal order quantity for a general demand 
distribution and solves the problem for normal demand distribution. Sankarasubramanian and 
Kumaraswamy (1983) solve the same problem and find the optimal order quantity for the 
retailer for the exponential and the uniform demand distributions.
4
 
Furthermore, according to a survey of Fortune 1000 industrial companies, Reece and 
Cool (1978) found that out of the 620 responding companies, 83%  measured the performance 
of their managers using the return on investment criterion. Hence, Manners and Louderback 
(1981) consider the return on investment as their objective criterion. However, they assume in 
their studies that sales and production are equal. Thakkar (1984) considers the same objective 
without this assumption. He finds a general solution for a general demand distribution 
                                                 
4
 Their findings for the uniform demand distribution are different than what we find in our study. 
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function for the expected return on investment maximization and the probability 
maximization of achieving a target return on investment level objectives. 
Other objectives studied in the literature are expected utility maximization and mean 
variance analysis. Khouja (1999) can be used for the literature review of these objectives. We 
do not study these objectives in the thesis.  
In our analysis, the objectives that we investigate are the probability maximization of 
achieving a target profit level, the expected return on investment maximization and the 
probability maximization of reaching a target return on investment level.   
1.2 Contract Types 
A contract is a volunteer agreement of two or more parties with the intention of 
creating legal obligations. Even though there are many contract types, only three of them, 
which are the wholesale price contract, the buy back contract and the revenue sharing 
contract, are studied in this thesis. 
1.2.1 The Wholesale Price Contract 
The supplier determines the selling price that is paid by the retailer to the supplier 
and the retailer determines order quantity for a given selling price. The retailer takes all the 
risk of overstocking and understocking (Cachon, 2003). 
1.2.2 The Buy Back Contract 
The parties determine a selling price that is paid by the retailer to the supplier, and a 
buy back price that is paid to the retailer by the supplier in case there is an overstocking. 
Compared to the wholesale price contract, the retailer has less risk (Cachon, 2003). 
 6 
 
1.2.3 The Revenue Sharing Contract 
The parties determine a selling price that is paid by the retailer to the supplier and a 
share fraction that determines what fraction of the revenue is kept by the retailer. In other 
words, some fraction of the revenue is paid to the supplier. In our work, the revenues from 
salvage products are also shared even though it is sometimes not the case in the real world. 
Like the buy back contract, retailer takes less risk compared to the wholesale price contract 
(Cachon, 2003). 
The contract specific variables are given below:  
                                                                                         
                                                                                    
                                                                            
                                                                                            
                                                   
If the order quantity is   , the transferred money from the retailer to supplier is 
 (   )     under the wholesale price contract. For the buy back contract, the transferred 
money is   (       )         (  ), where  (  ) is the leftover inventory at the end of 
the season. The transferred money in the revenue sharing contract is  (        )  
(    (   ) )   (   )(   ) (  )  where   is the salvage value of the product and 
 (  )  is the number of units sold from the season price (Cachon, 2003). 
1.3 Coordination 
According to Cachon (2003), a contract coordinates if the supply chain optimal 
actions follow a Nash equilibrium. In other words, none of the parties has an advantage to 
deviate from the supply chain’s optimal action. Since people are not able to foresee all 
possible contingencies of the contracts, none of the contracts are perfect. Without 
coordination, one party may deviate from the contract for his/her benefit and this might cause 
 7 
 
a new contract; thus, transaction costs increase dramatically and the trust between the parties 
is lost. If the coordination is satisfied, these problems do not occur.  
Additionally, the contract type should be flexible enough. In other words, the set of 
possible equilibrium values should be sufficiently large to represent power relations of the 
parties involved.   
 When the coordination is satisfied, the whole pie is bigger and the parties will share 
this pie according to their agreement. It might be possible to make one party better off, 
whereas the other party is at least no worse off. 
In the literature, there are many studies on different objectives as it is explained. 
Moreover, the contract types that coordinate the channel are known when the retailer’s and 
the supply chain’s objectives are the expected profit maximization. However, there is no study 
about the coordination when the parties’ objectives are different than expected profit 
maximization. The coordination for different types of objectives is the concern of this thesis, 
which makes it different than other studies. 
One of our assumptions about the coordination is there is one coordinator who 
determines the supply chain’s objective and the target, and the retailer determines his target 
accordingly, hence the retailer’s objective has to be the same as the supply chain’s objective. 
For example, if the supply chain’s objective is the probability maximization of achieving a 
target profit, then the retailer’s objective must be the same. The only difference might be the 
target levels.  One might think that the supplier does not decide anything and has to comply 
what is decided by the coordinator and the retailer; therefore, there is no advantage of the 
coordination for the supplier.  We assume that the coordinator should consider the supplier 
while deciding the supply chain’s target; hence we assume that the supplier directly or 
indirectly affects the target of the supply chain. 
According to the traditional definition of the coordination, in order to coordinate the 
channel, the following should be satisfied (Cachon, 2003): 
 8 
 
1. Optimal order quantity of the retailer and the supply chain should be same. 
2. Contract parameters should satisfy the assumptions described in section 2.3.3. 
3. The contract should be flexible enough. It should allocate the profit according to 
the powers of the parties. 
Additionally, for the probability maximization of reaching profit target and return on 
investment targets, the following condition should be satisfied: 
4. The contract should be sustainable. A sustainable contract should not allow for 
manipulation, it should reveal the truth at the stage of the setting parameters. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, some useful background 
information for the remaining chapters is given. The chapter has detailed information about 
the establishment of the parameters, variables, notations, assumptions of the problems and the 
formulations of commonly used demand functions. In Chapter 3, the general formulas for the 
optimal order quantities of the supply chain and the retailer are derived for each objective 
under each contract. Afterwards, some theorems that guarantee the uniqueness of these 
equations are obtained. By using these theorems, it is shown that some common demand 
distributions have unique solutions; therefore there is a unique optimal order quantity for 
these demand distributions. In Chapter 4, the necessary conditions for the coordination are 
analyzed under each contract type. In Chapter 5, some important factors while choosing the 
objective targets of the supply chain are examined and their effects are evaluated. Chapter 6 
concludes the thesis with a summary of the results.  
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CHAPTER  2    PRELIMINARIES 
This chapter provides the necessary background that will be useful throughout the 
remaining chapters. Section 2.1 describes the parameters, variables and their notations. 
Section 2.2 explains the necessary additional notations, which are used in the formulations. 
Section 2.3 identifies the assumptions for each objective and contract types for the retailer and 
the supply chain. Section 2.4 presents the common demand functions with their notations. 
These demand functions are used in the proofs and in the examples.  
2.1 Parameters and Variables 
2.1.1 Common Parameters and Variables 
The parameters below are same for different objectives and contract types. When the 
coordination is not the target, the retailer is not affected by the supplier specific parameters 
such as    and   . On the other hand, when the coordination is the issue, the retailer’s optimal 
order quantity should be equal to the supply chain’s optimal order quantity and these 
parameters affect the retailer since they also affect the optimal order quantity of the supply 
chain. 
List of common parameters is given below:  
                                        
                
                                                            
                                          
                                            (     ) 
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                                            (     ) 
Only common variable is demand, which directly affects the position of the both 
parties. The notation for the demand is given below: 
         
 When an example is given in this thesis, the demand distribution is generally chosen 
as one of the exponential, gamma, weibull, normal and uniform distributions, whose notations 
are presented in Section 2.4. On the other hand, more general distributions are also 
investigated in some theorems.  
2.1.2 Variables and Parameters for the Supply Chain 
Variables and parameters for the supply chain are independent of the contract types; 
hence they are valid for all contract types. On the other hand, some different variables and 
parameters are used for different objectives. If the target is the probability maximization of 
reaching a target profit level,   is used as the target value, whereas when the target is the 
probability maximization of reaching a target return on investment,   is used as the target 
return on investment value. There is no specific variable for the expected return on investment 
maximization. Supply chain specific variables and parameters are listed below: 
                                        
 (  )             
                         
   (  )             
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2.1.3 Variables and Parameters for the Retailer 
When the target for the retailer is the probability maximization of reaching a target 
profit, this target is represented by   , and when the target is the probability maximization of 
reaching a target return on investment, the target is shown by   . All not contract dependent 
variables for the retailer are shown below: 
                                    
  (  )         
                        
    (  )         
                                    
                                        
                                               
Even though the contract specific variables are presented in Chapter 1, Table 2-1 
presents these variables: 
Contract Type Parameters 
The Wholesale Price Contract   
The Buy Back Contract (    ) 
The Revenue Sharing Contract (     ) 
Table 2-1 Contract specific variables 
Note that              values need to be determined but they are not part of the 
contracts. 
2.2 Additional Notation 
In chapter 3, the optimal order quantities for the retailer will be derived for different 
objectives and different contract types. At first, optimal order quantities will be derived for 
the wholesale price contract. As can be seen later, the results for the buy back and the revenue 
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sharing contracts will be obtained with little modifications to the results of the wholesale price 
contract by using the notation shown below.    
Notation Actual  Value Contract Type 
       Buy back 
       Revenue sharing 
       Revenue sharing 
Table 2-2 Some simple notation used for the buy back and the revenue sharing contracts 
Furthermore, some other notations are used for different objectives because very 
complicated results might seem not very confusing when the appropriate notation is used. 
Additionally, the notations are good ways of showing the results in a nice and simple form. 
Hence, some other notations are used throughout the thesis.  
One might think that these notations can be divided into three categories according to 
the objective differences. On the other hand, there is no need to use a simplified notation for 
the maximization of the expected return on investment objective because the formulations are 
not complex for this objective. Hence, this section has mainly two subsections, in which there 
are some notations for the supply chain and the retailer for the probability maximization of 
reaching a target profit, and the probability maximization of reaching a target return on 
investment. All notations are presented in the tables. 
2.2.1 The Notations for the Probability Maximization of Reaching a 
Target Profit Level for the Supply Chain and the Retailer 
Supply 
Chain 
Retailer-Wholesale Retailer- Buy Back 
Retailer-Revenue 
Sharing 
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Table 2-3 The notations for the parties for the probability maximization of reaching a target profit level 
objective 
2.2.2 The Notations for the Probability Maximization of Reaching a 
Target Return on Investment Level for the Supply Chain and the 
Retailer 
Supply Chain Retailer-Wholesale 
   
        
 
     
  (    )    (    )    
  
 
   
      
   
     
  (    )  (    )   
   
 
 
Retailer- Buy Back Retailer- Revenue Sharing 
    
  (     )    (     )    
  
 
    
 
    (      )    (      )    
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  (     )  (     )    
    
      
  (      )  (      )     
       
 
Table 2-4 The notations for the parties for the probability maximization of reaching a target return on 
investment level objective 
2.3 Assumptions 
At first, the list of all assumptions is introduced
5
. After that, these assumptions are 
categorized, so that they are presented in different groups for different objectives and the 
contracts. Finally, the necessary assumptions for the coordination for each objective are 
established.  
2.3.1 List of Assumptions 
1.     : In order to ensure that the supply chain earns positive profit from what she 
sells, this condition must be satisfied. 
2.    :  Otherwise,      , a riskless quantity, will guarantee that profit is at least as 
large as  . 
3.      Otherwise, the supply chain makes profit from the salvage, which causes her 
to order infinite amount of the good. 
4. a)     : In order to ensure that the supplier earns money from what she sells this 
condition must be satisfied. 
b)        
                                                 
5
 In the list of assumptions, a) refers to wholesale price contract, b) refers to the buy back contract and c) 
refers to the revenue sharing contract. Since their use are similar, they are categorized under the same 
number. 
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c)    (   )      
5. a)      : This condition is necessary in order to ensure that the retailer earns 
positive profit from what he sells.  
b)        
c)            
6.     :  Otherwise,       , a riskless quantity, will guarantee that the profit is at 
least as large as   . 
7. a)           Otherwise, the retailer makes profit from the salvage, which 
causes him to order infinite amount of the good. 
b)            
c)              
8.   
   
 
 : Otherwise, it is not possible to reach   for the supply chain. 
9. a)    
      
    
 : Otherwise, it is not possible to reach    for the retailer. 
b)    
       
     
 
c)    
          
      
 
Note that we assume that assumptions 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 and 9 are already satisfied. 
Otherwise, suppose assumption 1 is not satisfied. Parties cannot do anything in order to make 
   ; thus the supply chain loses money for every unit she sells. Hence, we aim to satisfy the 
other assumptions by assuming that assumptions 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 and 9 are already satisfied. 
Additionally, some assumptions might change depending on the parties. For 
example, assumption 4c means that the supplier earns positive profit when the product is sold 
by the retailer. We can change this assumption to       ; hence the supplier earns positive 
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profit from what she sells to the retailer, but we use the assumption     (   )     in 
our study. 
2.3.2 The Summary Table for the Assumptions  
There are four tables that summarize the valid assumptions for different cases. In the 
first table, the assumptions are given for the supply chain for different objectives. After that, 
the retailer’s assumptions for different objectives are given for the three contracts in three 
tables.  
Note that if some assumptions are satisfied, another assumption may already be 
satisfied. For example, if assumptions 4a and 5a are satisfied, assumption 1 is satisfied. In this 
case, it is assumed that if one party needs to satisfy assumptions 4a and 5a, assumption 1 is 
also included in the table even though it is redundant. 
Objectives of the Supply Chain Assumptions 
Probability Maximization Reaching    1, 2, 3 
Expected Return on Investment 
Maximization 
1 
Probability Maximization of Reaching    1, 8 
Table 2-5 The necessary assumptions for different objectives for the supply chain 
Contract Type Assumptions 
Wholesale Price Contract 1, 3, 4a, 5a, 6, 7a 
Buy Back Contract 1, 3, 4b, 5b, 6, 7b 
Revenue Sharing Contract 1, 3 , 4c, 5c, 6, 7c 
Table 2-6 The necessary assumptions for different contract types for the probability maximization of 
reaching target profit for the retailer 
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Contract Type Assumptions 
Wholesale Price Contract 1,4a, 5a 
Buy Back Contract 1, 4b, 5b 
Revenue Sharing Contract 1, 4c, 5c 
Table 2-7 The necessary assumptions for different contract types for the expected return on investment 
maximization for the retailer 
Contract Type Assumptions 
Wholesale Price Contract 1, 4a, 5a, 9a 
Buy Back Contract 1, 4b, 5b, 9b 
Revenue Sharing Contract 1, 4c, 5c, 9c 
Table 2-8 The necessary assumptions for different contract types for the probability maximization of 
reaching target return on investment for the retailer 
In all chapters, proofs are done and examples are given by presuming that listed 
assumptions in these tables are satisfied. 
2.3.3  The Summary Table for the Assumptions of the Coordination 
Note that it is assumed that listed assumptions below should be satisfied in the proofs 
and examples of the coordination: 
Contract Type Assumptions 
Wholesale Price Contract 1, 2, 3, 4a, 5a, 6, 7a 
Buy Back Contract 1, 2 , 3 , 4b, 5b, 6, 7b 
Revenue Sharing Contract 1, 2, 3, 4c, 5c, 6, 7c 
Table 2-9 The necessary assumptions for the coordination for different contract types for the probability 
maximization of reaching target profit for the retailer 
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Contract Type Assumptions 
Wholesale Price Contract 1, 4a, 5a 
Buy Back Contract 1, 4b, 5b 
Revenue Sharing Contract 1, 4c, 5c 
Table 2-10 The necessary assumptions for the coordination for different contract types for the expected 
return on investment maximization for the retailer 
Contract Type Assumptions 
Wholesale Price Contract 1, 4a, 5a, 8, 9a 
Buy Back Contract 1, 4b, 5b, 8, 9b 
Revenue Sharing Contract 1, 4c, 5c, 8, 9c 
Table 2-11 The necessary assumptions for the coordination for different contract types for the probability 
maximization of reaching target return on investment for the retailer 
2.4 Notations of the Common Demand Distributions 
Throughout the thesis, there are some proofs and examples about the distributions 
identified in this section.  Five common demand distributions are presented. They are the 
exponential, gamma, weibull, normal and uniform distributions. 
2.4.1 The Exponential Distribution 
 (   )                         ,   ) 
2.4.2 The Gamma Distribution 
 (     )  
 
  
 
 ( )
      
 
                            ,   ) 
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2.4.3 The Weibull Distribution 
 (     )  
 
 
.
 
 
/
   
  .
 
 ⁄ /
 
                            ,   ) 
2.4.4 The Normal Distribution 
 (     )  
 
 √  
  
 
(   ) 
                           ,   ) 
2.4.5 The Uniform Distribution 
 (     )  
 
   
                      ,   - 
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CHAPTER  3    CALCULATION OF 
THE OPTIMAL ORDER 
QUANTITIES FOR THE 
SUPPLY CHAIN AND 
THE RETAILER 
In this chapter, the general formula for the supply chain’s and the retailer’s optimal 
order quantities are derived for each of the three objectives for any continuous demand 
function with unbounded domain. For the retailer, each objective is investigated with three 
contract types. Hence, for each objective there are four subsections, which are the supply 
chain’s optimal order quantity, the retailer’s optimal order quantity under the wholesale price 
contract, the retailer’s optimal order quantity under the buy back contract, and the retailer’s 
optimal order quantity under the revenue sharing contract.   
After deriving the general equations for the optimal order quantities for the retailer 
and the supply chain, the sufficient conditions ensuring that there is only one solution for a 
general continuous demand function with unbounded domain are introduced. If the sufficient 
conditions are satisfied for a given demand function, this means that there is a unique optimal 
order quantity for the given demand function and the contract type. Further, it is shown that 
the common demand distributions, which are given in Section 2.4, have unique solutions for 
all objective types, but the uniform distribution might have more than one solution for the 
probability maximization of reaching the target profit and target return on investment 
objectives. Having unique solution is essential because the first condition of the coordination 
is        
 . 
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This chapter assumes that the contract parameters, which are presented in Table 2-1, 
and the target values are given, and calculates the optimal order quantities accordingly. 
3.1 The Optimal Order Quantity when the Objective is the 
Probability Maximization of Reaching a Target Profit Level 
The objective for the supply chain is the probability maximization of achieving   / 
(probability minimization of not achieving  ), and the objective for the retailer is the 
probability maximization of achieving   / (probability minimization of not achieving   ). In 
other words, the objective for the supply chain is: 
             * (  )   +                * (  )   + 
where (  )      (    )   (    )
   (    )
      and the objective of the 
retailer is: 
             *  (  )    +                *  (  )    + 
where (  )      (    )   (    )
    (    )
  (    )  .  
In section 3.1.1, the general formula for the optimal order quantities for the supply 
chain and the retailer is obtained for the objectives described. Section 3.1.2 investigates the 
uniqueness conditions of these equations for any continuous demand distribution with 
unbounded domain, and it proves that the common demand distributions except the uniform 
distribution have unique solutions. 
3.1.1 General Formulas for the Order Quantities 
The equations are derived according to the probability minimization of not reaching 
the predetermined profit level, which is actually the same as the probability maximization of 
reaching the predetermined profit level. In other words: 
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           * (  )   + 
is used for the supply chain and 
           *  (  )    + 
is used for the retailer, in order to get the general formulas for the optimal order quantities. 
All proofs about the derivations of the formulations are given in Appendix A. 
3.1.1.1 The Supply Chain’s Optimal Order Quantity 
For any continuous demand function with unbounded domain, for given values of  
                the optimal order quantity for the supply chain must satisfy:  
 (       )
 (       )
 
  
  
             ( ) 
where     
     
 
   ,      
   
   
 ,    
 
 
  and     
 
   
 . 
3.1.1.2 The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Wholesale Price Contract 
For any continuous demand function with unbounded domain, for given values of 
              and  , the optimal order quantity for the retailer must satisfy: 
 (         )
 (         )
 
   
   
          ( ) 
where      
         
  
      
      
   
      
  
  
      
  
   
. 
3.1.1.3 The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Buy Back Contract 
For any continuous demand function with unbounded domain, for given values of 
             and (    ), the optimal order quantity for the retailer must satisfy: 
 23 
 
 (         )
 (         )
 
   
   
               ( ) 
where      
          
  
      
        
    
      
  
  
      
  
    
 , and        . 
3.1.1.4 The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Revenue Sharing Contract 
For any continuous demand function with unbounded domain, for given values of 
             and (     ), the optimal order quantity for the retailer must satisfy: 
 (           )
 (           )
 
    
    
               ( ) 
where      
             
  
       
          
       
       
  
  
       
  
     
         and 
      .  
The proofs of Equation (1) through (4) are given in Appendix A. Note that, 
Weierstrass Theorem is used in the proofs and this theorem is presented in Appendix J-1. 
3.1.2 Conditions for Uniqueness 
When there is more than one solution for both parties, agreement on a common order 
quantity is really difficult. Hence, it is essential for the retailer and the supply chain to have 
unique solutions because         
   should be satisfied in order to reach the coordination.   
This section establishes some theorems in order to indicate that Equations (1) 
through (4) have unique solutions for some general demand distributions. Firstly, some 
lemmas are introduced in order to prove the theorems, which are exploited in order to indicate 
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that the supply chain and the retailer have unique solutions for some distributions.
6
 All the 
proofs of the theorems are presented in Appendix B-1 and B-2. The proofs of the unique order 
quantities for the exponential, gamma, weibull and normal distributions are derived in 
Appendix C-1a, C-2, C-3 and C-4a respectively. There is no proof for the unique optimal 
order quantity for the uniform distribution by using these theorems. In fact, there is an order 
quantity that is optimal all the time but there might be some other quantities that are also 
optimal in some cases for the uniform demand distribution. Hence, there is no unique solution 
for this demand distribution. On the other hand, the order quantity that is always optimal is 
derived in Appendix C-5.  
The optimal order quantities for the exponential and normal demand distributions are 
attained in the Appendix C-1b and C-4. There is no closed form solution for the gamma and 
weibull distributions, but the unique optimal order quantities can be obtained numerically for 
these demand distributions. 
3.1.2.1 Uniqueness Conditions for the Supply Chain 
Lemma 1a:       
Proof:   Since      
     
 
   
   
 
  ,  and     
   
   
   
   
   
   and  by  using  the  
assumption 1, Lemma 1 is proved. 
  
Lemma 2a:  When     
 
   
 ,                 . 
 
                                                 
6
 Since the theorems for the supply chain and the retailer are very similar, they are shown with the same 
lemma or theorem numbers with slight changes. For example, first lemma is shown by Lemma 1a for the supply 
chain; Lemma 1b for the retailer under the wholesale price contract; Lemma 1c for the retailer when the buy 
back contract is used; and Lemma 1d for the retailer when the revenue sharing contract is used.  
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Proof: When    
 
   
 ,          and         are equal.  When    
 
   
 ,          
       , since       by Lemma 1a . 
  
Theorem 1a: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if  
 (       )
 (       )
  is a decreasing function of    for    
 
   
 and         
 (       )
 (       )
  , there 
exists a unique optimal solution for this problem. The proof is given in Appendix B-1. 
Theorem 2a: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if  
 (       )
 (       )
 is a decreasing function of    for        and an increasing function of    for 
 
   
      , where    is a fixed number such that     
 
   
 , and          
 (       )
 (       )
  , 
there exists a unique solution. The proof is presented in Appendix B-2. 
3.1.2.2 Uniqueness Conditions for the Retailer under the Wholesale Price Contract 
Lemma 1b:          
Proof:     
         
  
   
      
  
   
      
   
    . 
  
Lemma 2b:           
  
      
                    .  
Proof: When    
  
      
,                     . When    
  
      
,        
             ,  since          by Lemma 1b .  
  
Theorem 1b: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if  
 (         )
 (         )
 is a decreasing function of    for    
  
      
 and         
 (         )
 (         )
  , 
there exists a unique optimal solution for this problem. The proof is presented in Appendix B-
1. 
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Theorem 2b: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if 
 (         )
 (         )
 is a decreasing function of    for        and an increasing function of    for 
  
      
      , where    is a fixed number such that     
  
      
 , and 
       
 (         )
 (         )
  , there exists a unique solution. The proof is presented in Appendix 
B-2. 
3.1.2.3 Uniqueness Conditions for the Retailer under the Buy Back Contract 
Lemma 1c:        . 
Proof:     
          
  
   
       
  
   
       
    
    . 
  
Lemma 2c:         
  
       
                  . 
Proof: When    
  
       
,                     . When    
  
       
,         
             , since         by Lemma 1c. 
  
Theorem 1c: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if  
 (         )
 (         )
  is a decreasing function of    for    
  
       
 and         
 (         )
 (         )
  , 
there exists a unique optimal solution for this problem. The proof can be found in Appendix 
B-1. 
Theorem 2c: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if  
 (         )
 (         )
  is a decreasing function of    for        and an increasing function of    for  
  
       
      , where    is a fixed number such that     
  
       
 , and 
        
 (         )
 (         )
  , there exists a unique solution. The proof is presented in Appendix 
B-2.  
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3.1.2.4 Uniqueness Conditions for the Retailer under the Revenue Sharing Contract 
Lemma 1d:          . 
Proof:       
             
  
   
          
  
   
          
       
     . 
  
Lemma 2d:        
  
          
                        . 
Proof:  When      
  
           
 ,                          .  When     
  
          
  ,  
                        ,  since           by Lemma 1d. 
  
Theorem 1d: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if  
 (           )
 (           )
 is a decreasing function of    for    
  
          
 and         
 (           )
 (           )
 
 , there exists a unique optimal solution for this problem. The proof is presented in Appendix 
B-1. 
Theorem 2d: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if  
 (           )
 (           )
  is a decreasing function of    for        and an increasing function of    for 
  
          
      , where    is a fixed number such that     
  
          
 and 
        
 (           )
 (           )
  , there exists a unique solution. The proof is shown in Appendix B-
2.  
Important analytical results for the supply chain and the retailer are attained by using 
the theorems above. These are as follows: 
Result  3.1: For the exponential and normal distributions, the unique optimal order quantities 
for the supply chain and the retailer can be found analytically. Appendix C-1a and C-4a prove 
that these distributions have unique solutions, and Appendix C-1b and C-4b derive these 
solutions explicitly.  
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Result 3.2: For the weibull and gamma distributions, there is no closed form solution for the 
optimal order quantity, but they can be found numerically. Appendix C-2 and C-3 prove that 
there exists a unique solution for the weibull and gamma distributions.  
Result 3.3: These theorems do not help to show that the uniform distribution has a unique 
solution.  In fact, there is more than one solution in some cases. Hence, there is no unique 
optimal order quantity. On the other hand, Appendix C-5 proves that one specific order 
quantity is at least as good as the other order quantities. However, this does not mean that 
there is a unique optimal order quantity; therefore the coordination with uniform distribution 
might be very difficult. Hence, the supply chain coordination will not be analyzed for the 
uniform demand distribution in Chapter 4. 
According to Result 3.1 and 3.2, the unique optimal order quantities for the supply 
chain and the retailer can be obtained for some demand distributions. The unique optimal 
order quantity for the supply chain for the exponential demand distribution with        and 
                               , is given in Figure 3-1. 
 
Figure 3-1 The illustration of unique optimal order quantity for the supply chain 
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3.2 The Optimal Order Quantity when the Objective is 
Expected Return on Investment Maximization 
In this section, the supply chain’s and the retailer’s objectives are the expected return 
on investment maximization. In other words, the aim is to maximize expected            . 
We use Thakkar et al. (1984) as a main reference, but our work and his work have some 
differences. The main difference between this thesis and their study are cost functions. He 
also includes some fixed costs and investments in assets other than the product, but we only 
have variable cost in our work. By not taking into account of the fixed and investment costs, 
his model is ready to use in our work. The objective function for the supply chain is: 
          ,   (  )- 
where  ,   (  )-   
  ,  (  ) -
   
  and the objective function for the retailer is: 
          ,    (  )- 
where ,   (  )-   
  ,  (  ) -
(    )   
 . 
3.2.1 General Formulas for the Optimal Order Quantities 
The proofs of obtaining the equations for the optimal order quantities are given in 
Appendix D. 
3.2.1.1 The Supply Chain’s Optimal Order Quantity 
Supply chain’s cost is    . Expected profit is      *    +          *   
   +      *      +.  For a general continuous demand function with unbounded 
domain, the optimal order quantity satisfies: 
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 ∫    ( )  
  
 
                 ( ) 
where   is the mean of the distribution. Note that, the optimal order quantity is independent of 
the cost. 
3.2.1.2 The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Wholesale Price Contract 
The cost is (    )  . Expected profit for the retailer is      *    +  (  
  )       *      +       *      + . For a general continuous demand function 
with unbounded domain, the optimal order quantity satisfies: 
   
      
 ∫    ( )                ( )
  
 
 
3.2.1.3 The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Buy Back Contract 
The difference between the buy back and the wholesale contract is to use      
instead of    . Hence, for a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, the 
optimal order quantity satisfies: 
   
        
 
   
       
 ∫    ( )                ( )
  
 
 
3.2.1.4 The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Revenue Sharing Contract 
For this contract, p is changed to   , v is changed to   . The rest is the same as the 
wholesale price contract. For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, 
the optimal order quantity satisfies: 
   
        
 
   
          
 ∫    ( )                ( )
  
 
 
The proofs of Equation (5) through (8) are given in Appendix D. 
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3.2.2 The Unique Optimal Order Quantity Conditions  
From Equations (5) to (8), there is a unique solution for each equation for a general 
continuous demand function with unbounded domain. Therefore, the exponential, gamma, 
weibull and normal demand distributions have unique optimal order quantities. 
Proof: Left hand sides of Equations (5) to (8) are less than   and ∫    ( )    
 
 
. Hence, 
for some    , the left and the right sides are equal. When      , ∫    ( )  
  
 
 
∫    ( )  
  
 
  since the demand function is continuous. Therefore, there should be a unique 
solution for any continuous demand function with unbounded domained. Hence, the 
exponential, gamma, weibull and normal demand distributions have unique solutions. 
           
Additionally, the uniform distribution also has a unique optimal order quantity. 
Suppose that the upper bound for the uniform distribution is   and the lower bound is  . 
When    , the right side is equal to    which is greater than the left side of the Equations 
(5) to (8) . Hence, the optimal order quantity should be less than  . Similarly, when    , 
where   is the upper bound, the right side is equal to 0, hence the optimal order quantity 
should be larger than  . Since ∫    ( )  
  
 
 ∫    ( )  
  
 
 for          , there 
should be unique optimal order quantity for the uniform demand distribution. 
      
Hence, the following result is achieved for the expected return on investment 
maximization objective. 
Result 3.4: There is a unique optimal order quantity for the exponential, gamma, weibull, 
normal and the uniform demand distributions for each contract. Optimal order quantities are 
given implicitly in Equations (5), (6), (7) and (8). 
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3.3 The Optimal Order Quantity when the Objective is the 
Maximization of Probability to Reach a Target Return on 
Investment 
In this section, the supply chain’s and the retailer’s objectives are the probability 
maximization of reaching target return on investments. In other words, the supply chain’s 
objective is: 
          *   (  )   +               *   (  )   + 
where    (  )  
 (  )
   
 
    (   )  (    )
   (    )
     
   
  and the retailer’s objective is: 
          *    (  )    +               *    (  )    + 
where     (  )  
 (  )
(    )  
 
    (   )  (    )
    (    )
  (    )  
(    )  
 
3.3.1  General Formulas for the Optimal Order Quantities  
This part obtains the equations that give the optimal order quantity for the supply 
chain and the retailer. Note that the equations are derived according to the probability 
minimization of not reaching the target return on investment level, which is actually the same 
as the probability maximization of reaching the target return on investment level. In other 
words: 
          *   (  )   + 
is used for the supply chain and 
          *    (  )    + 
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is used for the retailer, in order to get the general formulas for the optimal order quantities. 
The proofs of Equations (9) through (12) are given in Appendix E. Note that, 
Weierstrass Theorem is used in the proofs and this theorem is presented in Appendix J-1. 
3.3.1.1 The Supply Chain’s Optimal Order Quantity 
Suppose the supply chain’s target is to reach the return on investment     In order to 
make the probability to reach the target larger than 0, K should be selected such that   
   
 
.  
Assume also that    
        
 
 and     
      
   
 . Then,         since   
   
 
. Hence, 
for any general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, the optimal order 
quantity should satisfy: 
 (    )
 (    )
 
  
  
                  ( ) 
3.3.1.2 The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Wholesale Price Contract 
Suppose the target for the retailer is    with     
  (    )   (    )   
  
 and 
    
  (    ) (    )  
   
. Then, for any general continuous demand function with unbounded 
domain, the optimal order quantity should satisfy: 
 (     )
 (     )
 
   
   
       (  ) 
The upper bound for     is  
      
    
 . Otherwise, the retailer never reaches the target return on 
investment. 
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3.3.1.3 The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Buy Back Contract 
For given    assume that     
  (     )   (     )   
  
 and 
    
  (     ) (     )   
    
. Then, for any general continuous demand function with 
unbounded domain, the optimal order quantity should satisfy: 
 (     )
 (     )
 
   
   
      (  ) 
The upper bound for     is  
       
     
 . Otherwise, the retailer never reaches the target return on 
investment. One should note that       . 
3.3.1.4 The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Revenue Sharing Contract 
Suppose that       
    (      )   (      )   
  
  and      
  (      ) (       )    
       
  
for given   . Then, for any general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, the 
optimal order quantity should satisfy: 
 (      )
 (      )
 
    
    
      (  ) 
The upper bound for     is  
          
      
 . Otherwise, the retailer never reaches the target return 
on investment. Note that         and       . 
The proofs of Equation (9), (10), (11) and (12) are presented in Appendix E. 
3.3.2 The Unique Optimal Order Quantity Conditions 
This part demonstrates that there is a unique solution for the common demand 
distributions except for the uniform demand function. Two lemmas are introduced first. Then, 
two theorems are introduced in order to prove that the common distribution functions, except 
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the uniform distribution, have unique solutions for the supply chain and the retailer. The 
theorems are proved in Appendix F-1 and F-2. The proofs for the unique optimal order 
quantities for the exponential, gamma, weibull and normal distributions are derived in 
Appendix G-1a, G-2a, G-3a and G-4a. Additionally, the optimal order order quantities for the 
exponential, gamma, weibull and normal distributions are presented in Appendix G-1b, G-2b, 
G-3b and G-4b respectively. 
It is not possible to show that the uniform distribution has a unique solution by using 
the theorems introduced.  Actually, there is more than one optimal order quantity in some 
cases.  On the other hand, Appendix G-5 proves that one specific order quantity is at least as 
good as the other order quantities. 
3.3.2.1 Uniqueness Conditions for the Supply Chain  
Lemma 3a:       
Proof:     
        
 
   
      
 
      
      
   
   
      
   
 since   
   
 
. 
  
Lemma 4a:               . 
Proof: Since      ,                 . 
  
Theorem 3a: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if  
 (    )
 (    )
  is 
a decreasing function of    for     ,         
 (    )
 (    )
  , and          
 (    )
 (    )
 
  
  
, then 
there exists a unique optimal solution for this problem. The proof is presented in Appendix F-
1. 
Theorem 4a: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if  
 (    )
 (    )
  is 
a decreasing function of    for       , an increasing function of    for        , where 
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   is a fixed number such that      ,         
 (    )
 (    )
  , and          
 (    )
 (    )
 
  
  
,  then 
there exists a unique solution. The proof is presented in Appendix F-2. 
3.3.2.2 Uniqueness Conditions for the Retailer under the Wholesale Price Contract 
Lemma 3b:         
Proof:  
    
  (    )   (    )   
  
   
  (    )   (    )
  
       
  (    ) (    )  
   
  
  
    (    ) (    )
   
  since    
      
    
. 
  
Lemma 4b:                 . 
Proof: Since        ,                   . 
  
Theorem 3b: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if  
 (     )
 (     )
 
is a decreasing function of    for     ,         
 (     )
 (     )
  , and          
 (     )
 (     )
 
   
   
,  then there exists a unique optimal solution for this problem. The proof is presented in 
Appendix F-1. 
Theorem 4b: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if  
 (     )
 (     )
 
is a decreasing function of    for         an increasing function of    for        , 
where    is a fixed number such that      ,         
 (     )
 (     )
  , and 
         
 (     )
 (     )
 
   
   
,  then there exists a unique solution. The proof is obtained in 
Appendix F-2. 
 37 
 
3.3.2.3 Uniqueness Conditions for the Retailer under the Buy Back Contract 
Lemma 3c:         
Proof:      
  (     )   (     )   
  
   
  (     )   (     )
  
        
  (     ) (     )   
    
   
    (     ) (     )
    
  since    
       
     
 . 
  
Lemma 4c:                 . 
Proof: Since        ,                  . 
  
Theorem 3c: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if  
 (     )
 (     )
 
is a decreasing function of    for     ,         
 (     )
 (     )
  , and          
 (     )
 (     )
 
   
   
,  
then there exists a unique optimal solution for this problem. The proof is presented in 
Appendix F-1. 
Theorem 4c: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if  
 (     )
 (     )
 
is a decreasing function of    for       , an increasing function of    for          
where    is a fixed number such that      ,         
 (     )
 (     )
   and          
 (     )
 (     )
 
   
   
 , then there exists a unique solution. The proof is derived in Appendix F-2. 
3.3.2.4 Uniqueness Conditions for the Retailer under the Revenue Sharing Contract 
Lemma 3d:           
Proof:     
    (      )   (      )   
  
   
    (      )   (      )
  
         
  (      ) (      )    
       
   
      (      ) (      )
       
  since    
          
      
. 
  
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Lemma 4d:                   . 
Proof: Since          ,                    . 
  
Theorem 3d: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if  
 (      )
 (      )
 
is a decreasing function of    for     ,          
 (      )
 (      )
    and          
 (      )
 (      )
 
    
    
, then there exists a unique optimal solution for this problem. The proof can be seen in 
Appendix F-1. 
Theorem 4d: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if 
 (      )
 (      )
 
is a decreasing function of    for      , an increasing function of    for         
where    is a fixed number such that      ,         
 (      )
 (      )
   and          
 (      )
 (      )
 
    
    
,  then there exists a unique solution. The proof is presented in Appendix F-2. 
Important analytical results for the supply chain and the retailer are achieved by 
using the theorems above. These are as follows: 
Result 3.5:  By using the theorems above, the proofs for the unique optimal order quantities 
for the exponential, gamma, weibull and normal distributions are presented in the Appendix 
G-1a, G-2a, G-3a and G-4a. Additionally, the unique solutions are derived in the Appendix G-
1b, G-2b, G-3b and G-4b for the exponential, gamma, weibull and normal distributions 
respectively for each contract. 
Result 3.6:  These theorems cannot be used in order to prove that the uniform distribution has 
a unique solution. In fact, the uniform demand distribution might have more than one 
solution. On the other hand, one specific order quantity that is always optimal is indicated in 
Appendix G-5. 
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According to result 3.4, the optimal order quantities for the supply chain and the 
retailer can be obtained for some demand distributions. In the figure below, the demand 
distribution is gamma with (θ,k) (    ) and the parameters are              
                    The unique optimal order quantity for the retailer is given for the 
wholesale price contract with     . 
 
Figure 3-2 The illustration of the unique optimal order quantity for the retailer for the wholesale price 
contract
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CHAPTER  4    COORDINATION FOR 
THE WHOLESALE 
PRICE, BUY BACK 
AND THE REVENUE 
SHARING CONTRACTS 
This chapter examines the supply chain coordination under different contract types 
when the supply chain’s and the retailer’s objectives are same and one of the three objectives 
discussed in the previous chapters. 
As it is stated in Chapter 1, there are four necessary conditions for the coordination. 
In order to satisfy the coordination, the following conditions should be satisfied: 
1. Optimal order quantity of the retailer and the supply chain should be same. In 
other words,         . 
2. All assumptions in Section 2.3 should be satisfied; thus the contract parameters 
should satisfy the assumptions of the coordination.
7
 
                                                 
7
 In this thesis, “the assumptions of the coordination” and “the necessary conditions for the coordination” 
mean different things. “The assumptions of the coordination” is explained in Section 2.3 and is one necessary 
condition for the coordination.  
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3. The contract should be flexible enough. Throughout the chapter, some examples 
will be given in order to show that whether the contracts are flexible or not. 
Additionally, for the probability maximization of reaching target profit and target 
return on investment, the following condition is essential: 
4. The contract should be free of manipulation; therefore it will be sustainable. 
Some examples will be provided in order to show that if the contracts are 
sustainable. Note that no proofs will be provided.    
There are three sections for each objective, and each section examines whether the 
contracts coordinate the channel by considering the necessary conditions of the coordination 
explained above. 
4.1 Coordination for the Probability Maximization of Reaching 
a Target Profit  
In this section, the wholesale price, the buy back and the revenue sharing contracts 
are analyzed. Since there is a corresponding buy back contract for the revenue sharing 
contract, these contracts are studied together. Note that there is no one-to-one correspondence 
for these contracts for the return on investment related objectives. 
4.1.1 The Wholesale Price Contract: The Necessary Conditions for the 
Coordination  
At first, the sufficient relation between    and   is determined in order to satisfy the 
assumptions of the coordination for     
    . Afterwards, we demonstrate that the 
wholesale price contract is not flexible enough because the wholesale price contract arbitrarily 
allocates the profit. Additionally, we demonstrate that this contract is not sustainable. 
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4.1.1.1 The Assumptions of the Coordination 
The idea is to satisfy assumptions 4a, 5a and 7a for     
    . If these 
assumptions are satisfied,    *       +        . On the other hand, since 
assumption 3 states that     ,    *       +    . Therefore, the assumptions of the 
coordination are satisfied if           . The following theorem is sufficient to ensure 
the satisfaction of the assumptions of the coordination: 
Theorem 5a: For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if 
 
 (    
     )
 (         )
 
   
   
   when     , then there exists   value that satisfies the assumptions of 
the coordination. 
Proof:  When       
  
  
 ,  
 (    
     )
 (         )
  . When       ,  
   
   
  . Hence, 
 
 (    
     )
 (         )
 
   
   
 when        
  
  
  since  
   
   
  is an increasing function of . 
  
If  
 (    
     )
 (         )
 
   
   
  is satisfied when     , then there exists at least one   
value that satisfies  
 (    
     )
 (         )
 
   
   
  for           
  
  
  by the Intermediate Value 
Theorem. One can see the explanation of the Intermediate Value Theorem in Appendix J-2. 
For this proof, one might think that         
  
  
 , but if this is the case, (  
 )     . This means that the retailer’s target is higher than the supply chain’s maximum 
possible profit, which is not reasonable. Hence,         
  
  
.  
One interpretation of Theorem 5a is for each R value, there is a set of     values that 
guarantee to make     , hence the assumptions of the coordination are definitely satisfied. 
For the exponential, gamma and weibull distributions, upper bounds for these    values are 
found explicitly or implicitly in Appendix H-1, H-2 and H-3. The upper bounds of    for 
other demand distributions can be calculated as well.  
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In Figure 4-1, there is an example for the upper bounds of    values for different 
values of    values. The parameters are                              
                , and the demand distribution is gamma with      and    . If    is 
chosen below the line, the assumptions of the coordination are definitely satisfied. 
4.1.1.2 The Flexibility and the Sustainability of the Contract 
In the previous part, we figure out sufficient conditions for the satisfaction of the 
assumptions of the coordination. However, even if these assumptions are satisfied, the 
coordination might not be possible because the contract might not be sustainable or it might 
not be flexible enough. 
Result 4.1: The wholesale price contract is not flexible. 
Result 4.2: The wholesale price contract is not sustainable. 
Example 4.1: Suppose the demand distribution is exponential with       . Other 
parameters are                                                     
For these parameters,         . For different values of   , conditions 1 and 2 of the 
Figure 4-1 The upper bound for the retailer’s target profit in order to suffice to satisfy the assumptions of 
the coordination 
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coordination are satisfied with different  ’s. The summary of the results are given in Table 4-
1.  
      
  
 *  ( 
 ) 
>1500|  + 
 *  ( 
 ) 
>1400|  + 
 *  ( 
 ) 
>1300|  + 
 *  ( 
 ) 
>1200|  + 
 *  ( 
 ) 
>1100|  + 
1500 20 76.1 0.382 0.399 0.417 0.435 0.452 
1400 25 76.1 0.319 0.335 0.352 0.369 0.386 
1300 28.5 76.1 0.274 0.291 0.308 0.325 0.342 
1200 31.4 76.1 0.235 0.252 0.27 0.287 0.304 
1100 34.2 76.1 0.195 0.214 0.232 0.25 0.267 
Table 4-1 An example for the manipulation when the wholesale price contract is used 
In Table 4-1, two significant drawbacks of the coordination with wholesale price 
contract can be observed. 
The first weakness is there is only a single arbitrary contract that satisfies the 
assumptions of the coordination for different values of   . Hence, this might cause a disparity 
between the profits of the retailer and the supplier. Consider the case with         . In this 
case, the supplier earns         from what she produces, whereas the retailer earns 
                   . Even if the supplier might have more power than the 
retailer, she has to accept       in order to coordinate the channel. 
Second disadvantage is that the retailer can deviate from his actual target in order to 
make the probability of reaching his actual target higher. For example, assume that his actual 
target is         With this target,         and  *  ( 
 )              +         
Suppose the manager of this retailer declares that their objective is to reach        Now, in 
order to satisfy the assumptions of the coordination,       and  *  ( 
 )          
    +       . Hence, the retailer will not hesitate to show his target as high as possible. 
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Since the contract is neither flexible nor sustainable, the coordination cannot be 
satisfied for the wholesale price contract. 
4.1.2 The Buy Back and the Revenue Sharing Contracts: The Necessary 
Conditions for the Coordination 
At first, it will be proved that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the buy 
back and the revenue sharing contracts. Then, the necessary conditions for the coordination 
will be analyzed. 
4.1.2.1 The Relationship Between the Buy Back and the Revenue Sharing Contracts 
Cachon (2003) indicates that these contracts are same if the followings are satisfied: 
       (   )  
  (   )(   ) 
Suppose the unit is sold. The supplier gets     (   )  in the revenue sharing 
contract, and she gets    in the buy back contract. Similarly, if the unit is not sold, the 
supplier gets     (   )   in the revenue sharing contract, whereas she gets       in 
the buy back contract. If the money that the supplier earns is equalized in both contracts for 
both cases, above results are achieved. 
Since the corresponding contracts bring the same profit, these contracts can be used 
interchangeably when the objective is about the profit. Therefore, there is a corresponding 
contract for the revenue sharing and the buy back contracts, not only for the expected profit 
maximization but also for the probability maximization of reaching the target profit level. 
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4.1.2.2 The Assumptions of the Coordination 
This part presents some theorems that suffice to satisfy the assumptions of the buy 
back contract. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the buy back and the 
revenue sharing contracts, these theorems hold for the revenue sharing contract too. 
We should satisfy the assumptions 4b, 5b and 7b for     
     . In other words, 
   *        +           should be satisfied. 
Theorem 5b: For a general continuous function, if  
 (    
     )
 (         )
 
   
   
   when      , then 
there exists    value that satisfies the assumptions of the coordination as long as        .  
Proof:  If      , we can modify the case of the wholesale price contract. In 4.1.1.1, the 
assumptions of the coordination are satisfied for the wholesale price contract if Theorem 5a 
holds. Suppose the salvage value of the wholesale price contract is increased by  . Then, the 
money  that  the retailer gets from the salvage becomes    . Hence, same theorem holds for  
the buy back contract too. 
  
One interpretation of Theorem 5b is that for each R value, there is a set of     values 
that suffice to make      ; therefore the assumptions of the coordination are definitely 
satisfied. Appendix H-1, H-2 and H-3 calculate the upper bounds of    for the exponential, 
gamma and the weibull distributions. Since there is a corresponding revenue sharing contract, 
we do not calculate the upper bounds for the revenue sharing contract separately.   
One might ask what happens if        . In this case, the little modification of 
Theorem 5b says: 
“For a general continuous function, if  
 (    
     )
 (         )
 
   
   
   when           , 
then there exists    value that satisfies the assumptions of the coordination as long as 
     .” 
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However, this theorem does not work because when          , 
   
   
  ; thus, 
there is no use of the theorem in the practice since 
 (    
     )
 (         )
 
   
   
  when          . 
However, this does not mean that there is no solution, but it means that either there is no 
solution or there are at least two solutions. The following example shows that there are two 
   values that satisfy the assumptions of the coordination. 
Example 4.2:  Suppose that the demand distribution is exponential with         Other 
parameters are                                                     
       Equation (3) states that 
 (    
     )
 (         )
 
   
   
; therefore  
 (    
     )
 (         )
 
   
   
  . For 
      , Figure 4-1 illustrates that the difference is 0 for two different    values. 
 
Figure 4-2 An example for having more than one solution for the buy back contract 
On the other hand, when        , no    value satisfies the assumptions of the 
coordination for     
    . Hence, there is still an upper bound for    to satisfy the 
assumptions of the coordination, but our theorems might not be effective enough to find these 
upper bounds especially when       . 
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4.1.2.3 The Flexibility and the Sustainability of the Contracts 
This part indicates that the buy back and the revenue sharing contracts are more 
flexible than the wholesale price contract, and they might be sustainable. However, note that 
these contracts might not be flexible enough. 
The examples are given for the buy back contract. However, by using the relation 
between the buy back and the revenue sharing contracts, same examples can be interpreted for 
the revenue sharing contract. 
Observation 4.1: When the buy back and the revenue sharing contracts become the wholesale 
price contract, the best solution is achieved for the supplier provided that the assumptions of 
the coordination are satisfied. In other words, the supplier gets highest share when     and 
   ; thus the retailer exploits the advantages of these contracts and the supplier’s share 
decreases with the use of the buy back and the revenue sharing contracts.  In the following 
examples, this observation is used. 
One should note that the observation 4.1 is not proved and it is the result of the 
observations after many simulations. 
Result 4.3: The buy back and revenue sharing contracts have more flexibility than the 
wholesale price contract.  
Example 4.3: Suppose that the demand distribution is normal with      and     . Other 
parameters are      ,      ,       ,      ,       ,        and           
The optimal order quantity for the supply chain is         . For        , some 
coordinating (    ) pairs for the buy back contract are (       ) (        ) and 
(          ). Corresponding (     ) parameters for the revenue sharing contract are 
(          ) (           ) and (            ). Hence, the buy back and the revenue 
sharing contracts have more option for the parameters compared to the wholesale price 
contract. 
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Result 4.4: The buy back and the revenue sharing contracts might not be flexible enough 
depending on the targets of the supply chain and the retailer.  
Example 4.4: Suppose the demand distribution is normal with      and     . Other 
parameters are                                         and         
Hence, the supply chain’s optimal order quantity is        Suppose the retailer is too risk 
averse and does not consider the supply chain’s target, so that his target profit is 1000. Two 
extreme pairs that satisfy the coordination are (    )  (        ) and (    )  
(        ). The supplier gets the highest share if the first pair is used, whereas the retailer 
gets almost his highest possible share if the second pair is used.  
The situations for the retailer and the supplier for both cases are presented below: 
(    ) Profit from each unit sold 
Profit from each unit 
unsold 
(        ) 72.315 72.315 
(        ) 70.94 -10.06 
Table 4-2 Profits for the supplier for sold and unsold items with different parameters when Rr =1000 and 
R=7000 
(    ) Profit from each unit sold 
Profit from each unit 
unsold 
(        ) 12.685 -87.315 
(        ) 14.06 -4.94 
Table 4-3 Profits for the retailer for sold and unsold items with different parameters when Rr =1000 and 
R=7000 
Assumption 7b states that          , hence    and    cannot be improved for 
the retailer anymore. Unfortunately, (    )  (        )  might not be enough to satisfy the 
retailer and there is no better contract parameters for the retailer. Therefore, even if the retailer 
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is the powerful side, he might not make enough money from what is sold even in the buy back 
contract. Whether (        ) is enough for the retailer and whether (        ) is enough for 
the supplier depends on the powers of the parties. 
The corresponding contract parameters for the revenue sharing contract are 
(     )  (        ) and (     )  (          ). The same result holds for the revenue 
sharing contract. 
Result 4.5: Unlike the wholesale price case, the buy back and revenue sharing contracts might 
be sustainable. 
Example 4.5: Suppose that the demand distribution is normal with      and     . Other 
parameters are      ,                    ,                              
The  optimal order quantity for the supply chain is         . The results are shown in the 
Table 4-4. 
        
   *  ( 
 ) > 2500|  +  *  ( 
 ) > 2000|  + 
2500 20 0 70.86 0.5003 0.6724 
2000 23.5 16.15 70.86 0.4336 0.7002 
Table 4-4 An illustration of closure to manipulation for the buy back contract 
Suppose the retailer has two options, which are either choosing         with 
      and     or          with         and        . In this case, there are two 
conditions to ensure the retailer not to deviate from his actual target. These are as follows: 
 *  ( 
 )              +   *  ( 
 )              +  (           ) 
 *  ( 
 )              +   *  ( 
 )              +  (           ) 
Since both conditions are satisfied, there is no reason for the retailer to make a 
manipulation since if his actual target is to reach 2500, then it is better for him to choose 
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2500.  If his actual target is 2000, he should choose 2000 as the target level. In other words, 
the manipulation does not occur because choosing         is better if the actual target is 
2500, whereas         is better if the actual target is 2000. 
Corresponding parameters for the revenue sharing contract are (   )  (    ) for 
        and (   )  (            ) for        . Probabilities are same; therefore 
the manipulation is prevented for the revenue sharing contract too. 
4.2 Coordination for the Expected Return on Investment 
Maximization 
In this section, the necessary conditions of the coordination for the three contracts are 
examined. Note that unlike probability maximization of reaching a target profit objective, the 
parties only determine the order quantity given the parameters
8
; hence the sustainability is not 
a concern in this part. 
4.2.1 The Wholesale Price Contract: The Necessary Conditions for the 
Coordination 
4.2.1.1 The Assumptions of the Coordination 
In addition to satisfying     
     , assumptions 1,4a and 5a should be satisfied 
in order for the coordination. Since        
  in coordination, the right hand sides of 
Equations (5) and (6) should be equal. In other words, the following equality should be 
satisfied: 
                                                 
8
 In probability maximization of reaching a target profit objective, the parties determine their targets first and 
choose order quantities accordingly; hence they have an opportunity to increase their probability to reach the 
actual target by adjusting their announced targets.  
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Hence, after simplification, the coordination is satisfied if and only if 
         (  ) 
Therefore, in this case, the assumptions of the coordination can be satisfied because 
any   value can be chosen. 
4.2.1.2 The Flexibility of the Contract 
The weakness of the wholesale price contract is the coordination is possible if and 
only if     . When this situation is satisfied, the supply chain is coordinated for any value 
of  ; thus the wholesale price contract can be used for the coordination when     . Note 
that the wholesale price contract is flexible enough. However, when     , the wholesale 
price contract cannot coordinate the channel because necessary condition 1 of the 
coordination is not satisfied. 
4.2.2 The Buy Back and the Revenue Sharing Contracts: The Necessary 
Conditions for the Coordination 
4.2.2.1 The Assumptions of the Coordination for the Buy Back Contract 
Now, the right hand sides of Equations (5) and (7) should be same in order for the 
coordination. Hence the left hand sides should be equal to each other. In other words, the 
following has to be satisfied: 
  
     
 
   
       
 
After some calculations, the following is obtained: 
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(   )  
 
      (  ) 
Hence, any    value can be chosen, which brings the satisfaction of the assumptions 
of the coordination. 
Now, if   =0 i.e.      ,    , which means that the contract becomes the 
wholesale price contract.  
4.2.2.2 The Assumption Satisfaction for the Revenue Sharing Contract 
Now, the right hand sides of Equations (5) and (8) should be same for the same order 
quantities. In order for the coordination, the left hand sides must also be equal to each other.  
In other words, the following equality should be satisfied: 
  
     
 
   
          
 
After some calculations, mandatory condition for     
      is: 
  
  
 
        (  ) 
Hence, any     value can be chosen, which brings the satisfaction of the assumptions 
of the coordination. 
Now, if   =0,    , all revenue is taken by the retailer. For this case, this contract 
is equal to the wholesale price contract. 
4.2.2.3 Is There a Corresponding Revenue Sharing Contract for a Buy Back Contract    
Note that the corresponding buy back and the revenue sharing contracts for the profit 
related objectives, can yield different return on investments because their initial investments 
are different. Actually, the same profit levels may be achieved with less initial investment 
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when the revenue sharing contract is used. Hence, a manager can use the advantage of the 
revenue sharing contract in order to show that he is successfully maximizes the expected 
return on investment. 
Theorem 6: There is no one-to-one correspondence between the revenue sharing and the buy 
back contracts when the objective is about the return on investment. 
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that there is a corresponding (     ) pair for (    ). Then, 
for the unsold items, the return on investment the retailer gets is 
  
      
   for the revenue 
sharing contract, and  
 
     
   for the buy back contract. In case there is a one-to-one 
correspondence, they should be equal; therefore         (   )  . For the sold items, 
the return on investment of the retailer is 
  
      
    for the revenue sharing contract and 
   
     
   for the buy back contract. When we use         (   )   ,and equate 
  
      
   with 
   
     
  ,    . Hence, there is no one-to-one correspondence for    . 
When     ,   the  buy  back  and  revenue   sharing  contracts  become  the  wholesale  price 
 contract. 
  
As a result, when the objective is about the return on investment, there is no one-to-
one correspondence between the buy back and the revenue sharing contracts. Furthermore, it 
is more advantageous to use the revenue sharing contract since it needs less initial cost for the 
same profit level.  
4.2.2.4 The Flexibility of the Buy Back and the Revenue Sharing Contracts 
In the buy back and revenue sharing contracts, coordination is satisfied by choosing  
  
(   )  
 
 and   
  
 
 respectively. For these values, any value of    or     coordinate the 
channel, hence the parties can agree on a    or     value for the fixed values of   and  , 
which is determined by Equation (14) and (15) respectively. Hence,    is determined 
according to powers of the parties; therefore enough flexibility is provided. 
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Example 4.6: Suppose the parameters are                              
           and the demand distribution is exponential with         If the buy back 
contract is used,   
(   )  
 
 
(     )  
  
   . For     , the coordination is satisfied. For 
each   , value the optimal order quantity for the retailer and the supply chain will be same 
and equal to       .  For some     values, maximum expected return on investments are 
presented in Figure 4-3. 
 
Figure 4-3 An example for the relation between wb and expected return on investment for the buy back 
contract when the coordination is satisfied 
Example 4.7: Suppose the same parameters in Example 4.6 are used and the revenue sharing 
contract is adopted. In order for the coordination,   
  
 
 
  
  
   ⁄ . For this value, the 
optimal order quantity for the retailer is      , which is independent of    . For different     
values, the expected return on investments are given in Figure 4-4. 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Ex
p
e
ct
e
d
 R
e
tu
rn
 o
n
 In
ve
st
m
e
n
t 
wb 
 56 
 
 
Figure 4-4 An example for the relation between wrs and expected return on investment for the buy back 
contract when the coordination is satisfied 
Hence,     is determined according to powers of the parties, and enough flexibility is 
provided. 
4.3 Coordination for the Probability Maximization of Reaching 
a Target Return on Investment 
This section analyzes the relationship between   and    in order to satisfy the 
assumptions of the coordination under each contract for     
    . Later, we investigate 
the flexibility and the sustainability of these contracts.  Note that there is no corresponding 
revenue sharing contract for a buy back contract. The proof is already presented in section 
4.2.2.3. 
4.3.1 The Wholesale Price Contract: The Necessary Conditions for the 
Coordination 
4.3.1.1 The Assumptions of the Coordination 
Suppose the supply chain’s optimal order quantity is     
    Then, in order to 
coordinate the channel, the assumptions 4a, 5a,7a and 9a should be satisfied for     
    . 
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In other words,    *       +       {     
 
    
   }  for     
    .Note that 
   *       +     because of the assumption 3 and    {     
 
    
   }  
 
    
   . 
Hence, it is enough to satisfy      
 
    
    for     
    . One might think that 
   
 
    
    , but in this case, (    )     , which is not reasonable. (    )      
should be satisfied because the retailer’s target should be lower than the supply chain’s 
maximum return on investment. 
Theorem 7a:  For a general continuous demand function with unbounded domain, if 
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
 when     , and      .  
    
   /
        
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
 , the assumptions of the 
coordination are satisfied. 
Proof: Intermediate Value Theorem proves Theorem 7a. 
  
Note that when   
 
    
   ,        .Equation (10) is satisfied 
since  
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
. Moreover, the assumptions of the coordination are satisfied. However, 
the probability of reaching    is 0. Hence this is not a solution. 
Additionally,     
  .
 
    
   /
        
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
  for the exponential, gamma, weibull 
and normal distributions since they have exponential components that go to 1 faster. Hence, if  
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
  when     , the assumptions of the coordination are satisfied for these 
demand functions. 
4.3.1.2 The Flexibility and the Sustainability of the Contract 
Result 4.6: The wholesale price contract is not flexible. 
Result 4.7: The wholesale price contract is not sustainable. 
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Example 4.8:  Suppose the demand distribution is exponential with       . Other 
parameters are                                                  ; 
thus the optimal order quantity of the supply chain is     . The summary of the results are 
given in Table 4-5. 
      
  
 *    ( 
 ) 
>0.445|  + 
 *    ( 
 ) 
>0.265|  + 
 *    ( 
 ) 
>0.124|  + 
 *    ( 
 ) 
>0.012|  + 
0.445 20 40.2 0.527 0.616 0.685 0.739 
0.265 25 40.2 0.453 0.545 0.614 0.669 
0.124 30 40.2 0.396 0.473 0.544 0.6 
0.012 35 40.2 0.313 0.396 0.471 0.528 
Table 4-5 The illustration of the manipulation for the wholesale price contract 
In the example above, there is only one contract that satisfies the assumptions of the 
coordination. In other words, there is a single   for each   . Additionally, the retailer might 
tell his target return on investment higher than his original target. For instance,  *    ( 
 )  
              +       , whereas  *    ( 
 )                 +        . Hence, 
it is advantageous for the retailer to tell his target higher than its actual value. Therefore, 
manipulation cannot be prevented by using the wholesale price contract. 
Since the wholesale price contract is neither flexible nor sustainable, it does not 
coordinate the channel. 
4.3.2 The Buy Back and the Revenue Sharing Contracts: The Necessary 
Conditions for the Coordination 
4.3.2.1 The Assumptions of the Coordination for the Buy Back Contract  
In order to satisfy the coordination,     
     and the assumptions 4b, 5b, 7b and 
9b should be satisfied. In other words,    *        +        {     
 
    
   }  for 
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     . Since    {     
 
    
   }  
 
    
       *        +     
 
    
 
    should be satisfied when     
    . 
Theorem 7b-1:  Suppose      .  For a general continuous demand function with 
unbounded domain, if  
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
 when       and       .
 
    
   /
        
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
, 
the assumptions of the coordination are satisfied. 
Proof:  When            *        +    . Hence,       
 
    
    will be 
enough  to  satisfy  the assumptions of  the  coordination. Theorem 6b-1  holds because of  the  
Intermediate Value Theorem. 
  
Note that when    
 
    
   ,         . Equation (11) is satisfied 
since  
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
. Moreover, the assumptions of the coordination are satisfied. However, 
the probability to reach    is 0. Hence this is not a solution. 
Additionally,     
   .
 
    
   /
        
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
  for the exponential, gamma, 
weibull and normal distributions since they have exponential components that go to 1 faster. 
Hence,  
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
  when      , is enough to satisfy the assumptions for these demand 
functions. 
Theorem 7b-2:  Suppose      .  For a general continuous demand function with 
unbounded domain, if  
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
 when          and       .
 
    
   /
        
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
, the assumptions of the coordination are satisfied. 
Proof:  When            *        +       . Hence,          
 
    
    
will be enough to satisfy the assumptions of  the coordination. Theorem 6b-2 holds because of  
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the Intermediate Value Theorem. 
  
Note that when    
 
    
   ,        .Equation (11) is satisfied 
since  
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
. Moreover, the assumptions of the coordination are satisfied. However, 
the probability of reaching    is 0. Hence this is not a solution.  
Additionally,     
   .
 
    
   /
        
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
  for the exponential, gamma, 
weibull and normal distributions since they have exponential components that go to 1 faster. 
Therefore,  
 (    
 )
 (     )
 
   
   
 when         , is enough to satisfy the assumptions for these 
demand functions. 
4.3.2.2 The Assumptions of the Coordination for the Revenue Sharing Contract  
For this case, assumptions 4c,5c,7c and 9c should be satisfied for     
    . In 
other words,    *   (   )        +         *       
   
    
   + for     
  
  .    {       
   
    
   }  
   
    
    , hence    *   (   )        +      
   
    
    should be satisfied. 
Theorem 7c-1:  Suppose     
     
 
. For a general continuous demand function with 
unbounded domain, if   
 (     
 )
 (      )
 
    
    
  when        (   )  and 
   
    .
   
    
   /
    
 (     
 )
 (      )
 
    
    
,  the assumptions of the coordination are satisfied. 
Proof: When     
     
 
,    *   (   )        +     (   ) . Hence, 
   (   )      
   
    
     is enough to satisfy  the assumptions of  the  coordination.  
Theorem 6c-1 holds due to the Intermediate Value Theorem. 
  
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Note that when     
   
    
   ,          . Equation (12) is satisfied since 
 
 (     
 )
 (      )
 
    
    
. Additionally, the assumptions of the coordination are satisfied. However, the 
probability of reaching    is 0. Hence this is not a solution.  
Furthermore,     
    .
   
    
   /
        
 (     
 )
 (      )
 
    
    
  for the exponential, gamma, 
weibull and normal distributions since they have exponential components that go to 1 faster. 
Hence,  
 (     
 )
 (      )
 
    
    
  when        (   ) , is enough to satisfy the assumptions of 
the coordination for these demand functions. 
Theorem 7c-2:  Suppose     
     
 
. For a general continuous demand function with 
unbounded domain, if 
 (     
 )
 (      )
 
    
    
 when            and 
   
    .
   
    
   /
        
 (     
 )
 (      )
 
    
    
, the assumptions of the coordination are satisfied. 
Proof: When     
     
 
,    *   (   )        +        . Hence,        
    
   
    
     is  enough  to  satisfy  the  assumptions  of  the  coordination. Theorem  6c-2  
holds due to the Intermediate Value Theorem. 
  
When     
   
    
   ,          . Equation (12) is satisfied because  
 (     
 )
 (      )
 
    
    
. Additionally, the assumptions of the coordination are satisfied. However, the probability 
of reaching    is 0. Hence this is not a solution. 
Note that     
    .
   
    
   /
        
 (     
 )
 (      )
 
    
    
  for the exponential, gamma, weibull 
and normal demand distributions since they have exponential components that go to 1 faster. 
Hence,  
 (     
 )
 (      )
 
    
    
 when           , is enough to satisfy the assumptions for these 
demand functions. 
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Appendix I-1, I-2 and I-3 presents the sufficient conditions for the satisfaction of the 
assumptions of the coordination for the exponential demand function for a given    for the 
wholesale price, buy back and the revenue sharing contracts. Note that the results are bulky; 
therefore it is assumed that       for the buy back contract and     
     
 
  for the 
revenue sharing contract in order not to do exhaustive calculations. The sufficient conditions 
for        and     
     
 
  can be calculated as well by using the same procedure. 
Note that these upper bounds are the approximations of the real upper bounds; hence might 
give lower bounds than the real upper bounds. 
4.3.2.3 The Flexibility and the Sustainability of the Contracts  
 It might be possible to prevent the manipulation and provide more flexibility with 
the buy back and revenue sharing contracts.  On the other hand, flexibility of the buy back and 
the revenue sharing contracts might not be sufficient depending on the targets of the parties. 
The following examples will illustrate these results. 
Observation 4.2: When the buy back and the revenue sharing contracts become the wholesale 
price contract, the best solution is achieved for the supplier provided that the assumptions of 
the coordination are satisfied. In other words, the supplier gets highest share when     and 
   ; thus the retailer exploits the advantages of these contracts and the supplier’s share 
decreases with the use of the buy back and the revenue sharing contracts.  In the examples 
below, this observation is used. 
Result  4.8: The buy back and the revenue sharing contracts provide more flexibility than the 
wholesale price contract. 
Result 4.9: Unlike the wholesale price contract, the manipulation can be prevented with the 
buy back and revenue sharing contracts.  
Example 4.9: Suppose that the demand distribution is normal with      and      and 
the buy back contract is used. Other parameters are                       
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                           For these values, the optimal order quantity for the 
supply chain is            Table 4-6 summarizes the results for the buy back contract. 
        
   *    ( 
 ) > 0.6|  +  *    ( 
 ) > 0.5|  + 
0.6 20 0 47.723 0.9297 0.9526 
0.5 21 7 47.723 0.928 0.9565 
Table 4-6 The illustration of closure to manipulation for the buy back contract 
Example 4.10: Suppose that the demand distribution is normal with      and      and 
the revenue sharing contract is used. Other parameters are                       
                         . The optimal order quantity is  
         . Table 4-7 
summarizes the results for the revenue sharing contract.  
        
  
 *    ( 
 ) 
>0.7|  + 
 *    ( 
 ) 
>0.6|  + 
 *    ( 
 ) 
>0.5|  + 
0.7 20 1 49.65 0.8925 0.9276 0.9493 
0.6 15 0.878 49.65 0.8919 0.9288 0.9515 
0.5 10 0.7545 49.65 0.8879 0.9267 0.9517 
Table 4-7 The illustration of closure to manipulation for the revenue sharing contract 
To start with, the manipulation is deterred in these two examples. Hence, the 
contracts are more sustainable. 
For another thing, for        for the buy back example, some other coordinating  
(    ) parameters are (       ) (       ) and (        ). Similarly, for        for the 
revenue sharing example, some other coordinating (     ) parameters are 
(      ) (        ) and (        ). Hence, this shows that the buy back and the revenue 
sharing contracts have more flexibility compared to the wholesale price contract. Hence, 
result 4.8 is satisfied. 
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Result 4.10: Depending on the targets of the parties, these contracts might not be flexible 
enough.     
Example 4.10: Suppose the demand is normally distributed with      and      and the 
revenue sharing contract is used. Other parameters are                       
                 with        Assume also that the retailer’s target is         One 
of the pairs is (     )  (      ) and another pair is (     )  (      ). However, we do 
not know if (     )  (      ) is good enough for the supplier, or (     )  (      ) is 
good enough for the retailer. Note that the first parameter pair is the best pair for the supplier, 
and the second parameter pair might be considered as a good solution for the retailer. 
However, whether there is an agreement or not, depends on the powers of the parties. Similar 
examples can be given for the buy back contract as well. 
To sum up, the relation between   and    should be considered, otherwise even the 
buy back and the revenue sharing contracts might not be good enough to bring sufficient 
flexibility. 
4.4 Main Results of Chapter 4 
Most important findings of Chapter 4 are summarized in the tables below for each 
objective type. 
 Assumptions 
Satisfaction 
Flexibility Sustainability 
Wholesale Price 
Depends on   and   . 
See Section 4.1.1.1 
Theorem 5a 
Not flexible. See 
Section 4.1.1.2 
Result 4.1 
Not sustainable. See 
Section 4.1.1.2 
Result 4.2 
Buy Back 
Depends on   and   . 
See Section 4.1.2.2 
Theorem 5b 
Limited. See Section 
4.1.2.3 Results 4.3 
and 4.4 
Possible. See 
Section 4.1.2.3 
Result 4.5 
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Revenue Sharing 
Depends on   and   . 
See Sections 4.1.2.1, 
4.1.2.2 Theorem 5b 
Limited. See Section 
4.1.2.3 Results 4.3 
and 4.4 
Possible. See 
Section 4.1.2.3 
Result 4.5 
Table 4-8 The summary table for the probability maximization of reaching a target profit 
 
Assumptions 
Satisfaction 
Flexibility Sustainability 
Wholesale Price 
Depends on the value 
of     See section 
4.2.1.1 Equation 13 
Depends on the value 
of    . See section 
4.2.1.2 
Not a concern 
Buy Back 
Depends on the value 
of   . See section 
4.2.2.1 Equation 14 
Depends on the value 
of    . See section 
4.2.2.4 
Not a concern 
Revenue Sharing 
Depends on the value 
of   . See section 
4.2.2.2 Equation 15 
Depends on the value 
of    . See section 
4.2.2.4 
Not a concern 
Table 4-9 The summary table for the expected return on investment maximization 
 
Assumptions 
Satisfaction 
Flexibility Sustainability 
Wholesale Price 
Depends on   and 
  . See Section 
4.3.1.1 Theorem 7a 
Not flexible. See 
Section 4.3.1.2 
Result 4.6 
Not sustainable. See 
Section 4.3.1.2 
Result 4.7 
Buy Back 
Depends on   and 
  . See Section 
4.3.2.1 Theorems 7b-
1, 7b-2 
Limited. See Section 
4.3.2.3 Result 4.8 
Possible. See Section 
4.3.2.3 Result 4.9 
Revenue Sharing 
Depends on   and 
  . See Section 
4.3.2.2 Theorems 7c-
1, 7c-2 
Limited. See Section 
4.3.2.3 Result 4.8 
Possible. See Section 
4.3.2.3 Result 4.9 
Table 4-10 The summary table for the probability maximization of reaching a target return on investment  
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CHAPTER  5    MORE ON SELECTING 
TARGETS OF THE 
SUPPLY CHAIN 
This chapter provides some observations about the effects of   and   values for the 
supply chain. 
5.1  Choosing   
Choosing    is a subjective task, hence some coordinators are risk averse and they 
choose very small values for  , whereas some of them might be greedy, so that they choose 
very high  . On the other hand, what very small and very large values are, can change from 
person to person.   
 According to Ozler, Tan and Karaesmen (2009), it is suggested that   can be chosen 
such that it is equal to the maximum expected profit, but this suggestion might not be 
endorsed by all the coordinators. On the other hand, maximum expected profit can be used as 
a benchmark in order to decide very small and very large values. The effects of the very small 
and very large values compared to the maximum expected profits are given with two 
examples below and our suggestion is not to choose very small and large values. 
Observation 5.1:  Very small values should not be chosen as the objective value because 
probably there is another target that is higher than the small target, almost have the same 
probability to reach the small target and also is more efficient to reach other targets. 
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Example 5.1:  Suppose the demand distribution is normal with      and     . Other 
parameters are                                           In this case, the 
maximum expected profit is       Assume that there are three coordinators, whose targets are 
      ,         and        . The results are summarized in the table below: 
      * (  )>300| +  * (  )>1908| +  * (  )>3500| + E[ (  )- 
300 27.512 0.983 0 0 869.061 
1908 53.851 0.9316 0.7118 0 1834.000 
3500 83.343 0.7738 0.4419 0.1445 1526.300 
Table 5-1 The effect of choosing a very low target profit level for the supply chain 
For this table, first coordinator does not have a big advantage to reach     over the 
second coordinator. Hence, it might not be reasonable to choose       . However, if it is 
crucially important to reach     , the coordinator may still choose 300 as her target.  
Hence, choosing      or      depends on the risk averseness of the coordinators. 
However, choosing     as a target profit, might not be a good decision.   
Observation 5.2: Choosing very high targets may cause unexpected results. 
Example 5.2: Suppose the same parameters with only change. Now        . The results 
are shown below: 
      * (  )>300| +  * (  )>1908| +  * (  )>8000| + E[ (  )- 
300 27.512 0.983 0 0 869.061 
1908 53.851 0.9316 0.7118 0 1834.000 
8000 179.344 0.0507 0.0056 0 -2672.300 
Table 5-2 The effect of choosing a very high target profit level for the supply chain 
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In this case, coordinator 3 never reaches her target in the simulation because the 
probability to reach the target is negligible and also her probabilities of reaching the other 
targets are very low too.  
To sum up, choosing the target as the maximum expected profit might be suitable as 
it is stated in Ozler, Tan and Karaesmen(2009), but the risk averseness of the coordinator 
determines the target profit level. However, one should remember that choosing too low or 
too high target might be disadvantageous.  
Observation 5.3: Depending on the problem parameters, choosing very high or low targets 
may result with low expected profits.  
Example 5.3: Suppose the demand distribution is normal with      and     . Other 
parameters are                         .Maximum expected profit is 
4297.Depending on different target values, expected profits will change. One can see the 
relation between the target values and the expected profits in the figure below. 
 
Figure 5-1 The effects of the target profits on the expected profits 
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In the figure, the maximum expected profit is achieved if the target is somewhere 
between 4000 and 6000 and the expected profit decreases when the target becomes smaller or 
larger. 
5.2 Choosing  
Observation 5.4: Different   values may yield the same order quantities. 
Example 5.4: Suppose                                         and the 
demand distribution is exponential with         For       and      , the optimal 
order quantities are 24.8. This indicates that different targets may result with the same order 
quantities. 
Observation 5.5: Choosing very small   may yield slightly higher probability to reach that 
target but it is very hard to reach other targets with that    
Example 5.5: Suppose                                        and the 
demand is normally distributed with      and     . The maximum expected return on 
investment is       . Suppose there are three coordinators and target return on investments 
are       ,           and       . For these values, optimal order quantities are 
       ,          and         . Note that the upper bound for the target return on 
investment is  
   
 
 
      
  
    
    
 *   (  ) 
>0.5| } 
 *   (  ) 
>3.5446| } 
 *   (  ) 
>3.9| } E[ROI( 
 )- 
0.5 17.2 0.9974 0.0743 0.0089 2.723 
3.5446 47.21 0.9934 0.7454 0.1891 3.530 
3.9 60.68 0.9899 0.6045 0.2529 3.320 
Table 5-3 The effect of choosing a very low target return on investment level for the supply chain 
 70 
 
According to the results from Table 5-3, choosing a very small   provides a small 
advantage to reach  , but the probability to reach other targets become dramatically smaller. 
Hence, when the decision maker is not sure about the target, he/she should consider larger 
values of     
Observation 5.6: Depending on the problem parameters, choosing very high or low targets 
may result with low return on investments. 
Example 5.6: Suppose the demand distribution is normal with with      and     . 
Other parameters are                           The effect of the return on 
investment targets on the expected return on investments are presented in the figure below. 
One should note that   
   
 
,  hence   
      
  
         
 
Figure 5-2 The effects of the target profits on the expected profit
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CHAPTER  6    CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, the supply chain coordination is examined when the objective is 
different than the expected profit maximization.   We analyze the probability maximization of 
reaching a target profit, expected return on investment maximization and the probability 
maximization of reaching a target return on investment objectives for the wholesale price, buy 
back and the revenue sharing contracts.  We have four necessary conditions for the 
coordination: 
1. Optimal order quantity of the retailer and the supply chain should be same. 
Therefore, it is important to have unique solutions for the given contract 
parameters. 
2. Contract parameters should satisfy the assumptions of the coordination, which 
are presented in section 2.3.3. 
3. The contract should be flexible enough. 
4. The contract should be sustainable.  
For the probability maximization of reaching a target profit objective, in order to 
ensure the first condition, the supply chain and the retailer should have unique optimal order 
quantities for the given contracts. Hence, we derive the general equation for the optimal order 
quantities for the supply chain and the retailer for the given contract parameters for any 
continuous demand distribution with unbounded domain. Then, we present theorems to ensure 
that there is a unique solution for these demand distributions for each contract. We find out 
that the exponential, gamma, weibull and the normal distributions have unique solutions, but 
the uniform distribution might not have a unique solution; thus the coordination is not 
possible for this demand distribution. 
 72 
 
 
Then, we present theorems in order to ensure that assumptions in section 2.3 are 
satisfied given the conditions. Note that these theorems are not necessary; hence sometimes it 
might be possible to satisfy the assumptions of the coordination without satisfying the 
theorems. but these theorems guarantee the satisfaction of the assumptions of the 
coordination. These theorems determine upper bounds for    for given  
 , which is the 
optimal order quantity of the supply chain. 
Then, the third and the fourth necessary conditions are analyzed with examples. By 
giving examples, even though it is impossible to prove that a contract is flexible or 
sustainable, examples can be used in order to show that a contract is not flexible or not 
sustainable. The coordination is not possible for the wholesale price contract since it is neither 
flexible nor sustainable. We do not find any evidence against the sustainability of the buy 
back and the revenue sharing contracts. Additionally, the buy back and the revenue sharing 
contracts are more flexible than the wholesale price contract, but they might not be flexible 
enough to allocate the profits according to the powers of the parties depending on    and  . 
Hence, with a (    )  pair that reflects the powers of the parties the coordination might be 
possible for the buy back and the revenue sharing contracts. 
For the expected return on investment maximization objective, the sustainability of 
the contract is not a concern. Hence, it is enough to satisfy the first three necessary conditions 
of the coordination. At first, the general equation for the optimal order quantities for the 
supply chain and the retailer are derived for any continuous demand function with unbounded 
domain. Then, it is shown that the exponential, gamma, weibull, normal demand distributions 
have unique solutions. Unlike the probability maximization of reaching a target profit 
objective, the uniform distribution also has a unique solution. After that, it is proved that the 
first condition of the coordination is satisfied if Equation (13), (14) and (15) are satisfied, 
which are independent of      and    . This brings the satisfaction of the assumptions of the 
coordination and the flexibility for each contract. According to Equation (14) and (15),   and 
  should be adjusted to satisfy the conditions of the coordination, so that the buy back and the 
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revenue sharing contracts coordinate the channel. Furthermore, Equation (13) is satisfied if 
and only if     . If     , the wholesale price contract coordinates; otherwise, it does not 
coordinate. 
For the probability maximization of reaching a target return on investment objective, 
a similar approach to the probability maximization of reaching a target profit objective is 
followed.  The results are also similar: The wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the 
channel since it is neither flexible nor sustainable. The buy back and the revenue sharing 
contracts can coordinate the channel depending on the values of    and  . If these values do 
not reflect the actual powers of the parties, then the parties might not be happy with their 
realized return on investments and if they are not chosen correctly, it might be impossible to 
satisfy the assumptions of the coordination. 
Finally, choosing the right   and   values are investigated in Chapter 5. Note that 
one of the targets of the coordination is to make the total pie bigger. Hence, it is important to 
choose right   and  . As a consequence, in case we are not 100% sure about the target, we 
should refrain from choosing too low or too high   values and too low   values since they 
end up with a slightly higher probability to reach the target but drastically lower probability to 
reach the other targets. 
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APPENDIX A 
Finding the Optimal Order Quantity for the Supply Chain and 
the Retailer for General Continuous Demand Functions with 
Unbounded Domain for the Probability Maximization of 
Reaching a Target Profit 
Note that the probability maximization of reaching a target profit objective is the 
same as the probability minimization of not reaching a target profit. The proofs are done 
according to the probability minimization of not reaching the target profit. In other words:  
           * (  )   + 
is used for the supply chain and: 
           *  (  )    + 
is used for the retailer. 
a) The Supply Chain’s Optimal Order Quantity 
Supply chain’s profit is  (  )      (    )   (    )
   (    )
     . 
The profit value changes depending on the demand. Two cases are considered according to 
different realized demand: 
 81 
 
Case 1:     :   (  )  (     )      . In order this profit to be less than or equal to 
 ,   
(     )    
 
 . Hence,      {   
(     )    
 
}. 
Case 2: D <   :   (  )  (   )  (   )  . In order this profit be less than or equal to 
 , we need to have    
  (   )  
   
 . Hence,      {   
  (   )  
   
}. 
Therefore, the supply chain’s objective is to minimize: 
 ̅ .   {   
(     )    
 
}/   .   {   
  (   )  
   
}/. 
Lemma: For    
 
   
 , {   
(     )    
 
}     , and for    
 
   
 ,    {   
(     )    
 
}  
(     )    
 
 . 
Proof:  For     
 
   
  ,  
(     )    
 
   
(   )  
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
 
   
    
 
 
   .  Hence,  
   {   
(     )    
 
}    .  
  
Similarly, for    
 
   
 , 
(     )    
 
 
(   )  
 
    
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
    
 
 
    . 
Therefore,    {   
(     )    
 
}  
(     )    
 
  for    
 
   
.  
      
              
Lemma: For    
 
   
 ,    {   
  (   )  
   
}     and for    
 
   
 ,    {   
  (   )  
   
}  
  (   )  
   
. 
Proof: For     
 
   
 ,  
  (   )  
   
 
 
   
 
(   )  
   
 
 
   
 
(   )  
   
 
 
   
     because  of  the  
assumption 3 that states      Hence,   {   
  (   )  
   
}    . 
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Similarly, when    
 
   
 , 
  (   )  
   
 
 
   
 
(   )  
   
 
 
   
    
(   )  
   
  
   
 
   
 
 
   
   .Therefore, when    
 
   
 ,   {   
  (   )  
   
}  
  (   )  
   
  
      
As it is stated before, the objective of the supply chain is: 
 ̅ .   {   
(     )    
 
}/   .   {   
  (   )  
   
}/. 
For      
 
   
 ,     {   
(     )    
 
}     and    {   
  (   )  
   
}     ; therefore 
the objective is 1, which means profit never reaches the target. Hence,    
 
   
. For    
 
   
 
, the objective is to minimize: 
 ̅ (
(     )    
 
)   (
  (   )  
   
) 
After taking the derivative and setting it equal to 0, we obtain: 
 
 (       )
 (       )
 
  
  
 
where     
     
 
 ,    
   
   
 ,    
 
 
 and    
 
   
. Note that Weierstrass Theorem 
guarantees the global minimum. One can see the explanation and use of Weierstrass Theorem 
in Appendix J-1. 
b)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Wholesale Price 
Contract 
The supply chain’s optimal order quantity is found above. Suppose in the result 
above,     ,      and     . In this case, the optimal order quantity for the supply 
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chain is equal to the optimal order quantity for the retailer. The optimal order quantity for the 
retailer must satisfy: 
   
 (         )
 (         )
 
   
   
 
where     
         
  
      
      
   
      
  
  
      
  
   
 . 
c)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Buy Back 
Contract 
Suppose that the salvage value of the wholesale price contract is increased from   to 
   . The optimal order quantity of the buy back contract is achieved with a little 
modification of the wholesale price contract. 
 (         )
 (         )
 
   
   
  
where      
          
  
      
        
    
      
  
  
      
  
    
 , and        . 
d)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Revenue Sharing 
Contract 
For this contract, suppose that the retailer’s selling price of one unit and the salvage 
values of the wholesale price contract are decreased to    and    respectively. The optimal 
order quantity for the revenue sharing contract is attained with an adjustment of the wholesale 
price contract which is:  
 (           )
 (           )
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where      
             
  
       
          
       
       
  
  
       
  
     
         and 
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APPENDIX B 
The Proofs of Theorem 1 and 2 
APPENDIX B-1 
The Proof of Theorem 1 
Theorem 1a: 
 When    
 
   
 ,  
 (       )
 (       )
  is 1 and 
 (       )
 (       )
 is a decreasing function of    
 
   
 
. Hence, as    becomes larger, 
 (       )
 (       )
 decreases and reaches 0 as     . Therefore, 
 (       )
 (       )
 
  
  
  just for one    value. 
Theorem 1b: 
When    
  
      
 ,  
 (         )
 (         )
  is 1 and 
 (         )
 (         )
 is a decreasing function of 
   
  
      
 . Hence, as    becomes larger, 
 (         )
 (         )
 decreases and reaches 0 as     . 
Therefore, 
 (         )
 (         )
 
   
   
   just for one    value. 
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Theorem 1c: 
When    
  
       
 ,  
 (         )
 (         )
  is 1 and 
 (         )
 (         )
 is a decreasing function of 
   
  
       
 . Hence, as    becomes larger, 
 (         )
 (         )
 decreases and reaches 0 as     . 
Therefore,  
 (         )
 (         )
  
   
   
  just for one    value. 
Theorem 1d: 
When    
  
          
,  
 (           )
 (           )
  is 1 and 
 (           )
 (           )
 is a decreasing function 
of    
  
          
 . Hence, as    becomes larger, 
 (           )
 (           )
 decreases and reaches 0 as 
    . Therefore, 
 (           )
 (           )
 
    
    
  just for one    value. 
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APPENDIX B-2 
The Proof of Theorem 2 
Theorem 2a: 
For a fixed    , for  
 
   
        ,  
 (       )
 (       )
  is more than 1 because 
 (       )
 (       )
 is 
1 when    
 
   
  and 
 (       )
 (       )
 is an increasing function until    . Then, 
 (       )
 (       )
 decreases 
and finally reaches 0. Therefore, its value is equal to  
  
  
  just for one    value . 
Theorem 2b: 
For a fixed    , for  
  
      
        ,  
 (         )
 (         )
  is more than 1 because 
 (         )
 (         )
 is 1 when    
  
      
  and 
 (         )
 (         )
 is an increasing function until    . 
Then, 
 (         )
 (         )
 decreases and finally reaches 0. Therefore, its value is equal to  
   
   
  just 
for one    value. 
Theorem 2c: 
For a fixed    , for  
  
      
        ,  
 (         )
 (         )
  is more than 1 because 
 (         )
 (         )
 is 1 when    
  
      
  and 
 (         )
 (         )
 is an increasing function until    . Then, 
 (         )
 (         )
 decreases and finally reaches 0. Therefore, its value is equal to  
   
   
  just for one 
   value. 
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Theorem 2d: 
For a fixed    , for  
  
      
        ,  
 (           )
 (           )
  is more than 1 because 
 (           )
 (           )
 is 1 when    
  
      
  and 
 (           )
 (           )
 is an increasing function until    . 
Then, 
 (           )
 (           )
 decreases and finally reaches 0. Therefore, its value is equal to  
    
    
  just 
for one    value. 
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APPENDIX C 
Proving that the Common Demand Distributions have Unique 
Solutions and the Derivations of the Unique Solutions for some of 
these Demand Distributions for the Retailer and the Supply Chain 
for the Probability Maximization of Reaching a Target Profit 
APPENDIX C-1 
The Exponential Demand Distribution has Unique Solution and 
the Derivation of the Optimal Order Quantity 
APPENDIX C-1a 
The Supply Chain and the Retailer have Unique Solutions  
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a)  The Supply Chain has a Unique Solution 
 (       )
 (       )
   
    (       )
    (       )
   (     )    (     ). 
1.         
  (     )    (     )     since       . 
2. 
    (     )    (     )
   
   (     ) 
  (     )    (     )              
Hence, the exponential demand distribution has a unique solution by Theorem 1a. 
b)  The Retailer has a Unique Solution under the Wholesale Price 
Contract  
 (         )
 (         )
   
    (         )
    (         )
   (       )    (       ). 
1.         
  (       )    (       )     since         . 
2. 
    (       )    (       )
   
   (       ) 
  (       )    (       )  
            
Hence, the exponential demand distribution has a unique solution by Theorem 1b. 
c)  The Retailer has a Unique Solution under the Buy Back Contract  
 (         )
 (         )
   
    (         )
    (         )
   (       )    (       ). 
1.          
  (       )    (       )     since         . 
 91 
 
2.  
    (       )    (       )
   
   (       ) 
  (       )    (       )  
            
Hence, the exponential demand distribution has a unique solution by Theorem 1c. 
d)  The Retailer has a Unique Solution under the Revenue Sharing 
Contract  
 (           )
 (           )
   
    (           )
    (           )
   (         )    (         ). 
1.         
  (         )    (         )     since           . 
2. 
    (         )    (         )
   
   (         ) 
  (         )    (         )  
            
Hence, the exponential demand distribution has a unique solution by Theorem 1d. 
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APPENDIX C-1b 
The Calculation of the Optimal Order Quantities  
a)  The Supply Chain’s Optimal Order Quantity 
Equation (1) states that  
 (       )
 (       )
    (     )    (     )  
  
  
   After proceeding 
some steps, we derive: 
      
  . 
  
  
 /
 (     )
  where     (     ). 
b)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Wholesale Price 
Contract 
Equation (2) states that  
 (         )
 (         )
    (       )     (       )  
   
   
   After 
proceeding some steps, we derive: 
      
  . 
   
   
/
 (       )
  where     (       ). 
c)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Buy Back 
Contract 
Equation (3) states that  
 (         )
 (         )
    (       )     (       )  
   
   
.  After 
proceeding some steps, we derive: 
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  ( 
   
   
)
 (       )
  where     (       ). 
d) The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Revenue Sharing 
Contract 
Equation (4) states that  
 (           )
 (           )
    (         )     (         )  
    
    
.  After 
proceeding some steps, we derive: 
      
  . 
    
    
/
 (         )
  where     (         ). 
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APPENDIX C-2 
The Gamma Demand Distribution has Unique Solution 
a) The Supply Chain has a Unique Solution 
 (       )
 (       )
 
(       )
   
(       )   
  (        )  
  (        )  
 
(       )
    (     )     (     )  
(       )   
  
1.        
(       )
    (     )      (     )  
(       )   
    by L’Hopital’s rule. 
2. Derivative with respect to    is:  
  
(       )
   
(       )   
(
  (   )
      
 
  (   )
      
 
  
 
 
  
 
) 
where     
                . One should note that      and 
(       )
   
(       )   
  , hence 
.
  (   )
      
 
  (   )
      
 
  
 
 
  
 
/    should be ensured in order to satisfy the uniqueness. After 
some calculations, 
  (   )
      
 
  (   )
      
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
(   )(         )
(      )(      )
 
  
 
 
  
 
  is obtained.  
Then, two cases are considered: 
       The gamma demand distribution has a unique solution by Theorem 1a. 
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      Derivative is less than 0 if and only if  
(   )(         )
(      )(      )
 
  
 
 
  
 
   . 
After some calculations, 
(   )(         )
(      )(      )
 
  
 
 
  
 
   (   ) (     
    )  (       )(       )(     ) . 
Note that (   ) (         ) is independent of   . Therefore, it is fixed. Even if 
(       )(       )(     )  can be less than (   ) (         )  for some  
   
 
   
 , (       )(       )(     )  (   ) (         ) after some     
value since (       )(       )(     ) is satisfied when      , and it is an 
increasing function with respect to   . Therefore, 
 (       )
 (       )
  may increase for a while, but 
then it decreases and reaches 0. If it constantly decreases, the gamma demand distribution has 
a unique solution by Theorem 1a. On the other hand, if it increases for a while and decreases 
after that, the gamma demand distribution has a unique solution by Theorem 2a. 
b)  The Retailer has a Unique Solution under the Wholesale Price, Buy 
Back and the Revenue Sharing Contracts 
By applying the same procedure, it can be proved that the retailer has a unique 
solution for the wholesale price, the buy back and the revenue sharing contracts. 
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APPENDIX C-3 
The Weibull Demand Distribution has Unique Solution 
a) The Supply Chain has a Unique Solution 
 (       )
 (       )
 
(       )
     (
       
 
) 
(       )    
 (
       
 
) 
 
1.    
   
(       )
    
 (
       
 
) 
(       )    
 (
       
 
) 
   
2. The derivative with respect to    is: 
  
(       )
   
(       )   
(
(   )     (   )    
(       )(       )
 
 
  
(  (       )
      (       )
   ) ) 
where    
  (       )
    
  (       )
    
 . Note that      and  
(       )
   
(       )   
  .  
Then, two cases are considered: 
      The derivative is less than or equal to 0. Hence, there exists a unique 
solution by Theorem 1a. 
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      .
(   )      (   )     
(       ) (       ) 
 
 
  
(  (       ) 
      (     
  )
   )  /     should be satisfied. 
 (       )
 (       )
  is a decreasing function after 
some        because 
(   )      (   )     
(       ) (       ) 
 is a decreasing function of    and 
 
  
(  (       ) 
      (       )
   )  is an increasing function of   , 
and        
(   )      (   )     
(       ) (       ) 
 
 
  
(  (       ) 
      (     
  )
   )      . Hence, like the Gamma distribution case, if 
 (       )
 (       )
 
constantly decreases, there is a unique solution by Theorem 1a and if it increases 
for a while, but decreases after that, the weibull demand distribution has a 
unique solution by Theorem 2a. 
b)  The Retailer has a Unique Solution under the Wholesale Price, Buy 
Back and the Revenue Sharing Contracts 
By applying the same procedure, it can be proved that the retailer has a unique 
solution for the wholesale price, the buy back and the revenue sharing contracts. 
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APPENDIX C-4 
The Normal Demand Distribution has Unique Solution and the 
Derivation of the Optimal Order Quantity 
APPENDIX C-4a 
The Supply Chain and the Retailer have Unique Solutions  
a)  The Supply Chain has a Unique Solution 
 
 (       )
 (       )
  =  
((         )
  (         )
 )
   
⁄
 
1.         
((         )
  (         )
 )
   
⁄
    since         
2. After taking derivative with respect to     we obtain: .  
(         )
  
 
  
(         )
  
/ 
 (       )
 (       )
   ⇔.  
(          ) 
  
   
(          ) 
  
/   , since 
 (       )
 (       )
  . Hence, (          )   (          )   should be less 
than 0. (          )   (          )   (  
      
    )  
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(         )  (       )     after some      , since            
after some       . Hence, the normal distribution has a unique solution by 
Theorem 2a. 
b)  The Retailer has a Unique Solution under the Wholesale Price,Buy 
Back and the Revenue Sharing Contracts 
By applying the same steps, it can be achieved that the wholesale price, buy back and 
the revenue sharing contracts have unique solutions from Theorem 2b, Theorem 2c and 
Theorem 2d respectively. 
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APPENDIX C-4b 
The Calculation of the Optimal Order Quantities  
a)  The Supply Chain’s Optimal Order Quantity 
For this demand function with mean   and standard deviation  , the following 
should be satisfied: 
 (       )
 (       )
  
(       )
  (       )
 
    
  
  
 
When we take          and         , we have the following equation: 
(  
    
 )   
   (         )    (  
    
     (
  
  
)   )     
By taking      
    
  ,     (         ) and       
    
  
   .
  
  
/  , the following roots are derived: 
   
   √ 
  
 
   
   √ 
  
 
We have a unique solution by Theorem 2a, but let us prove it in a different way.  
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We firstly show that there is at least one solution by showing that    . Then, we 
will prove that    is the unique optimal. 
Claim:     all the time. 
Proof: After some simplifications, 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 (         )
  (  
    
 )   .
  
  
/      , since   
    
     
and    .
  
  
/      . Therefore,  there  are  two  candidate  solutions, but  our claim is one of  
them never has a better objective value than the other one. 
  
Now, let us prove that there exists a unique solution all the time. The claim is 
   
 
   
   , thus    cannot be an optimal solution for this problem. Note that   is an 
increasing function of   since    is a decreasing function of   . Therefore,    is a decreasing 
function of   and    is an increasing function of   . Thus,    reaches its maximum value, 
whereas    reaches its minimum value when     . Thus, if we show that even if when    
      
 
   
    , we are done. 
For     ,    (         )
 . Thus, √              . 
Case 1:             √    (         ) . 
Lemma : 
     
     
 
 
   
 
Proof : 
     
     
 
(    ) (    ) 
     
 
 
 
 
 
   
     
 
 
   
   
 
 .
 
 
 
 
   
 /
.  
   
 
 / –.  
   
   
  /
 
 .
 
 
 
 
   
 /
(    ).
 
 
 
 
    
/
 
 
   
 
  
Lemma: When             ,   (   ) . 
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Proof: Suppose              .Then,            (     )   (     )   
 
 
       
 
   
        .
  
 
 
  
   
 / –  (      )   .
(   )
(   ) 
 
(     ) 
 (   ) 
 /  
 
(   ) (     )
(   )  
 
(     ) (  (   )  )
(   )  
   by the assumption of the lemma that says   
(   )      
Since   
 
   
, (   )
 
 
 
 
   
(   )    (    )     
   
 
    
 
   
(  
  ) . Hence, .
 
 
 
 
   
    / (   )  (
     
 
 
   
   
 ) . Thus,    
     
     
 
        
     
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
     
 
 
   
   
 
 
   
.  Note that    
     
     
 
 
   
. 
Hence for that case    
 
   
    is achieved. 
  
Case 2:             √   (         ) 
   
     
     
 
 
   
  
Lemma: When            ,   (   ) . 
Proof: Suppose               Then,           
(     )(  (   )  )
(   ) 
   by the 
assumption of the lemma that says    (   )   . 
    
     
     
 
 
   
  since   (   ) .  
Therefore, we showed that    
 
   
    for all rational values of             
values. Since the objective value is always 1 when    unit is ordered,    cannot be the optimal 
solution.  Hence, the optimal solution is: 
      
   √ 
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where     
    
 ,     (         ),       
    
     .
  
  
/  ,         
and        . 
  
b)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Wholesale Price 
Contract 
The optimal order quantity of the retailer is: 
      
   √ 
  
 
where      
     
 
 ,     (           ),       
    
     .
   
   
 /   , 
         and         . 
c)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Buy Back 
Contract 
The optimal order quantity of the retailer is: 
      
   √ 
  
 
where       
     
 
 ,     (           ),        
    
     .
   
   
 /   , 
         and         . 
d)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Revenue Sharing 
Contract  
The optimal order quantity of the retailer is: 
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   √ 
  
 
where        
      
 
,     (             ),      
    
     .
    
    
 /   ,  
          and          . 
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APPENDIX C-5 
The Calculation of the Optimal Order Quantity for the Uniform 
Demand Distribution 
a)  The Supply Chain’s Optimal Order Quantity 
Suppose the demand distribution is          (   ). Then, we have  
 (       )
 (       )
 
  
  
      
Hence, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 cannot be used in order to show that the uniform 
distribution has a unique solution. Actually, our claim is    
    
  
  is always optimal, but it is 
not the unique optimal in some cases. 
Claim: There is no better order quantity than   
    
  
 
Proof: We will prove the claim by considering two cases. Let us say    
    
  
  and    
    
  
. First case is to show that    
    
  
  is at least as good solution as any convex 
combinations  of     and   .  After that it is shown that     provides  better  solution  than  the  
other order quantities. 
  
Case 1: Suppose       .  
a) Our claim is for any    such that         ,    does not give a better solution than   . 
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Proof: Suppose        (   )   for      . Then, suppose for a contradiction    is 
a better solution than   . Then, 
 ̅ (       )   (       )   ̅(       )   (       ). 
Hence,                              . In other words,      
(     )       . Since         (   )  ,       (     )   (   )(   
  )         (     )           (   )    (     )
    
  
    
    
  
 
(   )  
    
  
.Therefore, 
  
  
 (    )   (    )  .  
  
  
 / (     )   (    ) 
     
  
  (    )
     
  
>0. Hence, 
    
  
 
    
  
  contradicts the assumption of case 1. 
  
b) For any      ,    does not give a better solution than   . 
Proof:  Suppose    is a better solution. Then,  ̅ (       )   (       )  
 ̅(       )   (       ) . Moreover,  (       )   ( )    and  (       )  
  since          . Therefore, our claim is  ̅ (       )   ̅(       ). However, 
since                ,  ̅ (       )   ̅(       ), which is a contradiction. 
Therefore,     does  not  give  a  better  solution than     and    does not give a better solution  
than     Hence, there is no better solution than   . 
  
c)  For any      ,   does not give a better solution than   . 
Proof: Suppose    is a better solution than   . Then,  ̅ (       )   (       )  
 ̅(       )   (       ) . Since          ,  and          ,  ̅(       )  
 ̅ (       )   . Additionally, since                ,  (       )  
 (       ). Therefore,    does not give better objective value than   .  
 
Hence, for case 1,     offers at least as good solution as       . 
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Case 2:       
Proof:                    and          ; therefore  ̅(       )  
 (       )   . Even though some other quantities guarantee to reach that target too, we 
know that      guarantees to achieve the target profit level as well. Hence,    is still an 
optimal solution. 
Since in both cases there is no quantity that gives a better result than   ,    
    
  
   
is always optimal. 
Hence,  we  show  that  uniform  distribution  might  not  have  a unique solution, but  
   
    
  
   is always optimal. 
  
b)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Wholesale Price 
Contract 
      
     
   
  is always optimal. 
c)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Buy Back 
Contract 
      
     
   
  is always optimal. 
d)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Revenue Sharing 
Contract 
      
      
    
  is always optimal.  
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APPENDIX D 
The Proof for Optimal Order Quantity for the Expected Return 
on Investment Maximization for the Supply Chain and the 
Retailer 
a)  The Supply Chain’s Optimal Order Quantity 
Let T is the total profit.  Then, for a discrete demand distribution: 
 ,    -  (     )∑    ( )  (           ) ∑  ( )      
 
   
 
   
            
Also, 
 ,      -   ,    -  (     ) ∑  ( )
  
   
 (     ) 
Since we maximize the return on investment, we increase    as long as: 
 ,      -
 (    )
 
 ,    -
   
   [ (     ) ∑  ( )
  
   
 (     )]       ,    -    
After some simplifications, we derive: 
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 ∑   ( )  
  
   
 
Hence, for a continuous demand function with unbounded domain, we obtain the 
optimal solution for the supply chain is: 
  
     
 ∫   ( )  
  
 
 
b)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Wholesale Price 
Contract 
By applying the same procedure, the optimal order quantity for the retailer is:  
   
      
 ∫   ( )  
  
 
 
c)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Buy Back 
Contract 
By applying the same procedure, the optimal order quantity for the retailer is:  
   
       
 ∫   ( )  
  
 
 
d)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Revenue Sharing 
Contract 
By applying the same procedure, the optimal order quantity for the retailer is:  
   
          
 ∫   ( )  
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APPENDIX E 
Finding the Optimal Order Quantity for the Supply Chain and 
the Retailer for General Continuous Unbounded Domained 
Functions for the Probability Maximization of Reaching a Target 
Return on Investment Objective 
Note that the probability maximization of reaching a target return on investment 
objective is the same as the probability minimization of not reaching a target return on 
investment. The proofs are done according to the probability minimization of not reaching the 
target profit. In other words:  
          *   (  )   + 
is used for the supply chain and: 
          *    (  )    + 
is used for the retailer as the objective functions. 
a)  The Supply Chain’s Optimal Order Quantity 
Supply chain’s profit is  (  )      (    )   (    )
   (    )
     . 
Profit value changes depending on the demand. The cost is    . Two cases are considered 
according to the demand: 
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Case 1:     :  (  )  (     )     , and the cost is     . In order the return on 
investment be less than or equal to      
(        )  
 
 . Hence,      {   
(        )  
 
}. 
Since    
   
 
 ,   {   
(        )   
 
}  
(        )   
 
        . 
Case 2:     :  (  )  (   )  (   )   and the cost is    .  In order the return on 
investment be less than or equal to  ,   
(      )  
   
 . Hence,      {   
(      )  
   
}. 
Since   
   
 
,   {   
(      )  
   
}  
(      )  
   
         
Hence, the supply chain’s objective is simply to minimize: 
 ̅ (
(        )  
 
)   (
(      )  
   
) 
After taking the derivative and setting it equal to 0, we derive: 
   
 (    )
 (    )
 
  
  
 
where     
        
 
 ,    
      
   
    Note that Weierstrass Theorem guarantees the global 
minimum. The explanation of the Weierstrass Theorem can be found in Appendix J-2. 
b)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Wholesale Price 
Contract 
The supply chain’s optimal order quantity is found above. Suppose the result above 
with      ,      and     . In this case, the optimal order quantity for the supply chain 
is equal to the optimal order quantity for the retailer. The optimal order quantity for the 
retailer must satisfy: 
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 (     )
 (     )
 
   
   
 
where     
  (    )   (    )   
  
 and     
  (    ) (    )  
   
. 
c)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Buy Back 
Contract 
 Suppose that the salvage value of the wholesale price contract is increased from   to 
   . The optimal order quantity of the buy back contract is achieved with a little 
modification of the wholesale price contract, which is: 
 (     )
 (     )
 
   
   
     
where     
  (     )   (     )   
  
 and     
  (     ) (     )   
    
. 
d)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Revenue Sharing 
Contract 
Suppose that the price and the salvage values of the wholesale price contract are 
decreased to    and    respectively. The optimal order quantity for the revenue sharing 
contract is attained wih an adjustment of the wholesale price contract, which is:  
 (      )
 (      )
 
    
    
       
where      
    (      )   (      )   
  
  and      
  (      ) (       )    
       
. 
 114 
 
APPENDIX F 
The Proofs of Theorem 3 and 4 
APPENDIX F-1 
The Proof of Theorem 3 
Theorem 3a: 
 Since          
 (    )
 (    )
 
  
  
   by the assumption and 
 (    )
 (    )
 is a decreasing, 
continuous demand function of    with unbounded domain, and it is goes to   as       , 
there exists a unique solution  
Theorem 3b: 
Since    
     
 
 (     )
 (     )
 
   
   
  by the assumption and 
 (     )
 (     )
 is a decreasing, 
continuous demand function of    with unbounded domain, and it is goes to   as       , 
there exists a unique solution. 
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Theorem 3c:  
Since    
     
 
 (     )
 (     )
 
   
   
  by the assumption and 
 (     )
 (     )
 is a decreasing, 
continuous demand function of    with unbounded domain, and it is goes to   as       , 
there exists a unique solution  
Theorem 3d:  
Since    
     
 
 (      )
 (      )
 
    
    
  by the assumption and 
 (      )
 (      )
 is a decreasing, 
continuous demand function of    with unbounded domain, and it is goes to   as       , 
there exists a unique solution. 
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APPENDIX F-2 
The Proof of Theorem 4 
Theorem 4a: 
For a fixed    , for           ,  
 (    )
 (    )
  increases until   , and it is more than 
  
  
 
because it is more than 
  
  
  even if    goes to zero. Afterwards, it decreases and finally reaches 
0. Therefore, 
 (    )
 (    )
  
  
  
  just for one    value such that      . 
Theorem 4b: 
For a fixed    , for           ,  
 (     )
 (     )
  increases until    , and it is more than  
   
   
  because it is more than 
   
   
  even if    goes to zero. Afterwards, it decreases and finally 
reaches 0. Therefore, 
 (     )
 (     )
  
   
   
  just for one    value such that      . 
Theorem 4c: 
For a fixed    , for           ,  
 (     )
 (     )
   increases until    , and it is more than 
   
   
  because it is more than 
   
   
  even if    goes to zero. Afterwards, it decreases and finally 
reaches 0. Therefore, 
 (     )
 (     )
 
   
   
  just for one    value such that      . 
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Theorem 4d: 
For a fixed    , for           ,  
 (      )
 (      )
     increases until    , and it is more than 
    
    
 because it is more than 
    
    
  even if    goes to zero. Afterwards, it decreases and finally 
reaches 0. Therefore, 
 (      )
 (      )
  
    
    
  just for one    value such that      . 
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APPENDIX G 
Proving that the Common Demand Distributions have Unique 
Solutions and the Derivations of the Unique Solutions for some of 
these Demand Distributions for the Retailer and the Supply Chain 
for the Probability Maximization of Reaching a Target Return on 
Investment 
APPENDIX G-1 
The Exponential Demand Distribution has Unique Solution and 
the Derivation of the Optimal Order Quantity 
APPENDIX G-1a 
The Supply Chain and the Retailer have Unique Solution  
 119 
 
a) The Supply Chain has a Unique Solution 
1.        
 (    )
 (    )
    (     )     since        . 
2.         
 (    )
 (    )
    (     )     
  
  
  
3. The derivative with respect to    is –  (     ) 
  (     )    . Hence, 
 (    )
 (    )
 
is a decreasing function of   ; thus the exponential demand function has a 
unique optimal order quantity by Theorem 3a. 
b)  The Retailer has a Unique Solution under the Wholesale Price,Buy 
Back and the Revenue Sharing Contracts 
It can be obtained that the retailer has a unique solution for the wholesale price, buy 
back and the revenue sharing contracts by applying the same procedure. 
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APPENDIX G-1b 
The Calculation of the Optimal Order Quantities  
a)  The Supply Chain’s Optimal Order Quantity 
 (    )
 (    )
    (     )   
  
  
 . After some calculations, we have     
  (
  
  ⁄ )
 (     )
  
b)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Wholesale Price 
Contract 
By applying the same procedure, the optimal order quantity of the retailer is     
  .
   
   
⁄ /
 (       ) 
  
c)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Buy Back 
Contract 
By applying the same procedure, the optimal order quantity of the retailer is     
  .
   
   
⁄ /
 (       ) 
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d)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Revenue Sharing 
Contract 
By applying the same procedure, the optimal order quantity of the retailer is     
  .
    
    
⁄ / 
 (         ) 
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APPENDIX G-2 
The Gamma Demand Distribution has Unique Solution and the 
Derivation of the Optimal Order Quantity 
APPENDIX G-2a 
The Supply Chain and the Retailer have  Unique Solutions  
a)  The Supply Chain has a Unique Solution  
1.        
 (    )
 (    )
   (     )    .
  
  
/
   
=0 
2.         
 (    )
 (    )
   (     )    .
  
  
/
   
   
  
  
 
3. The derivative with respect to    is –
 
 
(     ) 
 
(     )   
 (
  
  
)    <0. Hence, 
the gamma  demand distribution has a unique solution by Theorem 3a. 
b) The Retailer has a Unique Solution under the Wholesale Price,Buy Back and 
the Revenue Sharing Contracts 
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It can be obtained that the retailer has a unique solution for the wholesale price, buy 
back and the revenue sharing contracts by applying the same procedure. 
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APPENDIX G-2b 
The Calculation of the Optimal Order Quantities 
a) The Supply Chain’s Optimal Order Quantity 
 (    )
 (    )
   (     )    .
  
  
/
   
 
  
  
    
   (
  
  ⁄ )  
     
 . 
b)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Wholesale Price 
Contract 
The optimal order quantity for the retailer is    
   .
   
   
⁄ / 
       
 
c)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Buy Back 
Contract 
The optimal order quantity for the retailer is    
   .
   
    
⁄ / 
       
 
d)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Revenue Sharing 
Contract 
The optimal order quantity for the retailer is    
   .
   
   
⁄ / 
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APPENDIX G-3 
The Weibull Demand Distribution has Unique Solution and the 
Derivation of the Optimal Order Quantity 
APPENDIX G-3a 
The Supply Chain and the Retailer have Unique Solutions  
a)  The Supply Chain has a Unique Solution 
1.         
 (    )
 (    )
   (  
    
 )(
  
 
)
 
(
  
  
)      . 
2.         
 (    )
 (    )
   (  
    
 )(
  
 
)
 
(
  
  
)       
  
  
 
3. The derivative of  
 (    )
 (    )
 with respect to    is less than 0 everywhere. Hence, the 
weibull demand distribution has a unique solution by Theorem 3a. 
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b)  The Retailer has a Unique Solution under the Wholesale Price,Buy 
Back and the Revenue Sharing Contracts 
It can be obtained that the retailer has a unique solution for the wholesale price, buy 
back and the revenue sharing contracts by applying the same procedure. 
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APPENDIX G-3b 
The Calculation of the Optimal Order Quantities 
a) The Supply Chain’s Optimal Order Quantity 
For the supply chain, optimal order quantity is  
 (    )
 (    )
 
  
  
    √
   (
  
  ⁄ )  
 
       
 
. 
b)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Wholesale Price 
Contract 
   
√
   (
   
   
⁄ )  
   
     
 
 
 
c)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Buy Back 
Contract 
   
√
   (
   
   
⁄ )  
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d)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Revenue Sharing 
Contract 
   
√
   (
    
    
⁄ )  
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APPENDIX G-4 
The Normal Demand Distribution has Unique Solution and the 
Derivation of the Optimal Order Quantity 
APPENDIX G-4a 
The Supply Chain and the Retailer have Unique Solutions  
a)  The Supply Chain has a Unique Solution 
1.         
 (    )
 (    )
  
(      )
  (      )
 
   =0. 
2.         
 (    )
 (    )
  
(      )
  (      )
 
      
  
  
 
3. At first 
 (    )
 (    )
 might increase, but after some   value it decreases. Hence, the 
normal demand function has a unique solution by Theorem 4a. 
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b)  The Retailer has a Unique Solution under the Wholesale Price, Buy 
Back and the Revenue Sharing Contracts 
It can be obtained that the retailer has a unique solution for the wholesale price, buy 
back and the revenue sharing contracts by applying the same procedure. 
 131 
 
APPENDIX G-4b 
The Calculation of the Optimal Order Quantities 
a)  Supply Chain’s Optimal Order Quantity 
We have   
 .  
    
 /  
    (     ) 
    
  
  
.  Consider Appendix C-4b. In this problem, 
we have the similar characteristics.    is changed to   ,    is changed to    with       
 .     
 -  
  ,      (     ) and        .
  
  
/     . The optimal order quantity is:  
   
   √ 
  
  
b)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Wholesale Price 
Contract 
     
 
-   
 
,       (       ) and         .
   
   
/  , so the optimal 
order quantity is : 
   
   √ 
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c)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Buy Back 
Contract 
     
 
-   
 
,       (       )  and        .
   
   
/   , hence the optimal 
order quantity is:  
   
   √ 
  
 
d)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Revenue Sharing 
Contract 
      
 
-    
 
,       (         ) and        .
    
    
/  ; therefore the 
optimal order quantity is:  
   
   √ 
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APPENDIX G-5 
The Calculation of the Optimal Order Quantity for the Uniform 
Demand Distribution 
Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 cannot be used because there is no way to satisfy the 
Equation (9) to 12 with the uniform distribution. Note that there is no unique solution for the 
uniform distribution. On the other hand, the order quantities below are always optimal. 
a)  The Supply Chain’s Optimal Order Quantity  
By the change of necessary parameters of Appendix C-5, the optimal order quantity 
is found to be     .  
b)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Wholesale Price 
Contract 
By the change of necessary parameters of Appendix C-5, the optimal order quantity 
is found to be       . 
c)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Buy Back 
Contract 
By the change of necessary parameters of Appendix C-5, the optimal order quantity 
is found to be       . 
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d)  The Retailer’s Optimal Order Quantity under the Revenue Sharing 
Contract 
By the change of necessary parameters of Appendix C-5, the optimal order quantity 
is found to be        . 
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APPENDIX H 
Upper Bound for the Target Profit Level for the Retailer in order 
for the Coordination for the Exponential, Gamma and the 
Weibull Demand Distributions 
APPENDIX H-1 
Exponential Distribution 
a)  Wholesale Price Contract 
When     ,     
      
  
  and     
   
   
 . In order to ensure the assumptions of 
the coordination, the following should be satisfied:  
 .
      
  
    
  
  
/
 .
    
   
    
  
   
/
 
   
   
      
  
 
Hence, 
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   (       ) 
 
  
   .
 
  
 
 
   
/
 
   
   
      
  
 
By simplifying this, we derive: 
   (   ) 
  
  .
(   )  
(   )(      )
/
 (
 
  
 
 
   
)
 
b)  The Buy Back Contract 
Assume that         By applying the same procedure, we derive: 
   (   ) 
  
  .
(    )  
(    )(      )
/
 (
 
  
 
 
    
)
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APPENDIX H-2 
Gamma Distribution  
a)  The Wholesale Price Contract 
In order to ensure the assumptions of the coordination, the following should be 
satisfied: 
 .
      
  
    
  
  
/
 .
    
   
    
  
   
/
 
   
   
      
  
 
Namely, we need to satisfy: 
(    
     )
    (       ) 
     (       )  
(         )   
 
   
   
      
  
 
After simplification, we derive: 
   (   ) 
  
   (
(   )  
(   )(      )
(
    
   
   
  
       
  
      
)
   
)
(
 
  
 
 
   
)
 
Note that this is an implicit solution for    because     and     are also functions 
of   . 
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b)  The Buy Back Contract 
Assume that         The following has to be satisfied in order to ensure that the 
assumptions of the coordination: 
   (   ) 
  
   (
(    )  
(    )(      )
(
    
    
    
  
       
  
      
)
   
)
.
 
  
 
 
    
/
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APPENDIX H-3 
Weibull Distribution 
a)  The Wholesale Price Contract 
We need to satisfy: 
 .
      
  
    
  
  
/
 .
    
   
    
  
   
/
 
   
   
      
  
 
In other words, the following should be satisfied: 
(    
     )
   
(         )   
  ( (    
     )
  (    
     )
 )    
   
   
 
where    
      
  
  and    
   
   
  when     . 
There is no explicit solution, but     should satisfy: 
(    
     )
  (    
     )
      (
   
   
 
(    
     )
   
(         )   
) 
b)  The Buy Back Contract 
Assume that        The following has to be satisfied in order to ensure that the 
assumptions of the coordination: 
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(    
     )
  (    
     )
      (
   
   
 
(    
     )
   
(         )   
) 
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APPENDIX I 
Upper Bound for the Target Return on Investment Level for the 
Retailer in order for the Coordination for the Exponential, 
Gamma and the Weibull Demand Distributions 
APPENDIX I-1 
The Exponential Demand 
a)  The Wholesale Price Contract 
Suppose the supply chain’s optimal order quantity is     
   When     ,     
    
(      )(       )
(   )  
  and  
   
   
 
(       )  
(   )(          )
 .  
We need to satisfy:  
    
(      )(       )
(   )  
   (
(       )  
(   )(          )
) 
 After some calculations, we derive: 
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(   )  
(      )    
  (
(   )(          )
(       )  
) 
b)  The Buy Back Contract 
Assume that        By applying the same procedures, we derive: 
   
   
 
 
(    )  
(       )    
  (
(    ) (          )
(        )  
) 
c)  The Revenue Sharing Contract 
Assume that     
     
 
.  By applying the same procedures, we derive: 
   
     
 
 
(       )  
(          )    
  (
(       ) (            )
(         )  
) 
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APPENDIX I-2 
Gamma Distribution 
a)  The Wholesale Price Contract 
Note that when     ,         
(      )(       )
(   )  
  and  
   
   
 
(       )  
(   )(          )
 . .
   
   
/
   
 (       ) 
    
   
   
 should be satisfied. Hence,  
 (       ) 
    .
   
   
/
 
 should be satisfied. Therefore, (       )      .
   
   
/
 
  
. 
After some calculations, we derive: 
   
   
 
 
  
   
(   )  
(      )
  (
(   )(          )
(       )  
) 
b)  The Buy Back Contract 
Assume that        By applying the same procedure, we derive: 
   
   
 
 
  
   
(    )  
(       )
  (
(    )(          )
(        )  
)  
c)  The Revenue Sharing Contract 
Assume that     
     
 
. By applying the same procedure, we derive: 
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(       )  
(          )
  (
(       )(            )
(         )  
)  
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APPENDIX I-3 
Weibull Distribution 
a)  The Wholesale Price Contract 
Note that when     ,         
(      )(       )
(   )  
  and  
   
   
 
(       )  
(   )(          )
. 
We need to satisfy .
   
   
/
   
 ( (    
 )  (    
 ) )    
   
   
. Hence, (   
  
   
 )   .
 
  
/
  
   .
   
   
/ should be satisfied. 
Note that this is all we can obtain, we can find the upper bound by trial and error. 
b)  The Buy Back Contract 
Assume that        We derive: 
(   
     
 )   (
 
  
)
  
   (
   
   
)  
c)  The Revenue Sharing Contract 
Assume that     
     
 
. We derive: 
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(    
      
 )   (
 
  
)
  
   (
    
    
) 
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APPENDIX J 
Explanations of the Theorems 
APPENDIX J-1 
Weierstrass Theorem 
The following results can be achieved by using the Weierstrass Theorem (Brinkhuis 
and Tikhomirov, 2005): 
A continuous function on a nonempty compact set in R
n
 attains its global maxima 
and minima. Often we will use the following consequence. A continuous function f:R
n→R on 
the whole R
n 
is called coercive for minimization if: 
   
      
 ( )     
Corollary:  A continuous function f:R
n→R that is coercive for minimization has a 
global minimum. 
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APPENDIX J-2 
Intermediate Value Theorem 
A function    ( ) that is continuous on a closed interval ,   - takes on every 
value between  ( ) and  ( ). In other words, if    is any value between  ( ) and  ( ), then 
    ( ) for some   in ,   - (Thomas et al., 2004).  
